The issuance of circulating liabilities, together with endogenous debt limits, gives rise to a franchise value for intermediaries. A competitive equilibrium with endogenous debt limits admits allocations that are characterized by a funding crisis and a self-fulfilling collapse of the banking system, with the intermediary’s franchise value eroding over time. In view of these difficulties, I construct a sophisticated fiscal policy that provides a government guarantee for the franchise value, which results in the determinacy of equilibrium, with the constrained efficient allocation emerging as the unique outcome.
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Working Paper
Financial Instability with Circulating Debt Claims and Endogenous Debt Limits
November 2020
WP 20-45 — This paper develops a banking model in which intermediaries issue liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange to finance loans to entrepreneurs, who use the proceeds to fund the accumulation of capital goods.
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