



# WORKING PAPERS

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DOES JUNIOR INHERIT? REFINANCING AND THE  
BLOCKING POWER OF SECOND MORTGAGES**

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# **Does Junior Inherit?**

## **Refinancing and the Blocking Power of Second Mortgages<sup>1</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Refinancing a first mortgage puts legal principles in conflict when other, junior, liens also exist. On one hand, the principle that seniority follows time priority leaves the new refinancing mortgage junior to mortgages that were junior to the original, refinanced first mortgage. On the other hand, the principle of equitable subrogation gives the refinancing mortgage the seniority of the claim it paid down. States resolve this tension differently, thus differentiating how much a second mortgage impedes refinancing of the first. We exploit this cross-state variation to identify the impact on mortgage refinancing and find that refinancing is significantly more likely in the states following the principle of equitable subrogation when the homeowner also has a second mortgage.

JEL: D12, G18, H73, K11

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## 1. Introduction

Residences in the U.S. often have multiple mortgages. As of March 2012, 23.5% of homes with a mortgage had more than one; as of December 2008 it was 30%.<sup>1</sup> In these cases, the mortgages' relative seniority generally follows a simple rule: Seniority follows the mortgages' time order. The mortgage taken out first is the most senior, followed by the next mortgage taken out, and so on. This principle, which we label *time priority*, is convenient and easy to follow, but it has a potentially perverse effect on refinancing a first mortgage, because a replacement for the first of multiple mortgages is newer than, and thus by this principle junior to, mortgages that the original first mortgage was senior to. The originally junior mortgagees can waive this windfall of seniority with *subordination agreements*, i.e., documents affirming their subordination to the replacement mortgage, but they don't have to. Thus, in a refinancing situation, a second mortgagee can wield blocking power over the mortgagor. This paper addresses the effect of this blocking power.

We can identify the effect of the blocking power through its variation across states. This is because a subset of states follows a legal principle known as *equitable subrogation* that targets and largely eliminates the perverse effect. Subrogation is the inheritance by a new creditor of the seniority of the creditor it paid off; equitable subrogation provides that this inheritance occurs when the new mortgage does not disadvantage junior mortgagees, relative to the old mortgage. So if the new mortgage has principal and interest no higher, and maturity no shorter, than the mortgage it extinguished, then it enjoys the old mortgage's seniority, despite the violation of time priority. If the new mortgage, relative to the old, impairs the junior mortgagee on one of these dimensions, then it enjoys seniority to an extent equivalent to that of the old. By eliminating the second mortgage's role in refinancings that do not disadvantage it, equitable

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<sup>1</sup> Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel.

subrogation removes its blocking power, which means we can observe the effect of this power in the contrast in refinancings between those in states that have adopted this principle and those in states adhering to strict time priority.<sup>2</sup>

Whether a refinancing is exposed to this blocking power depends not only on local state law but also on the mortgagor's remaining home equity, reflected in the home's combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV). If the CLTV is low enough, then the mortgagor can refinance all mortgages at once, thereby avoiding bargaining by extinguishing all bargainers' claims. If the CLTV is high enough, then refinancing any mortgage is unlikely. It is in the middle region where refinancing the first of multiple mortgages arises and, therefore, where the second's bargaining power matters. Consequently, the identification is a triple difference: the difference across states of the difference between medium-CLTV refinancings and low- or high-CLTV refinancings of mortgages that are or are not senior to second mortgages.

To run this identification, we assemble a database of recent mortgages, starting with 3.9 million mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007 from the LPS Mortgage Dataset. We associate them with junior liens by matching them to credit bureau data, and we keep our CLTV estimates current by updating house prices with zip-code-level indices. Our database of state laws is current as of September 2008, so we focus on refinancing in 2009. This was a period of significant financial distress, which introduces other issues into refinancing, so to focus on the effect of the legal environment, we limit our sample to mortgagors who were current on all mortgages as of December 2008. In addition, as can be seen from Figure 1, mortgage rates dropped dramatically at the end of 2008, which spurred a wave of refinancing.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> We are grateful to Dale Whitman for assembling and providing the database showing the variation of the legal environment across states.

<sup>3</sup> The refinancing originations are from the HMDA data, and the mortgage rates are the 30-year mortgage rates from the FHLMC primary mortgage market survey.

Our principal finding is that refinancing is significantly affected by the legal environment. In the states without equitable subrogation, the probability of refinancing is much lower, relative to the other states, when the CLTV is in the medium range between 75% and 95%. There is little or no effect when CLTV is higher or lower, and the difference between the medium-CLTV case and the others is statistically significant. A probit specification finds the probability of refinancing to be 1.3 percentage points higher in the refinancing-friendly environment, relative to the sample average 2009 refinancing probability for homeowners in the middle-CLTV region of 12%.

The rest of this paper is in four sections. In Section 2 we survey the related legal and economic literature, in Section 3 we describe the data, in Section 4 we describe the empirical testing strategy and discuss its results, and in Section 5 we summarize and conclude.

## **2. Background and Literature**

Junior mortgages figure heavily in both pre-crisis borrowing and in subsequent distress. There is an accordingly large and growing literature on the role of junior mortgagees in the resolution of distress. The focus of this literature is not on refinancings that potentially alter seniority, but rather on modifications that preserve seniority while forgiving principal. The main concern this literature addresses is the weak incentive of junior mortgagees to forgive and the resulting difficulty reducing prohibitive indebtedness. Relevant studies include Agarwal et al. (2011), Cordell et al (2008), Goodman (2011), and Mayer et al. (2009).

The principle of time priority that we focus on is summarized in this passage from Schmudde (2004):

“The first mortgage on a property, being the first recorded, has first priority. All later recorded mortgages applying to a single property are called “junior” mortgages. The basic rule of mortgage priority is that it is set by the time of recording. Earlier recording grants earlier priority. This can only be changed when a mortgagee who has earlier recorded agrees to subordinate her interest.”<sup>4</sup>

The problem arising from this principle is that it ties a potentially deal-breaking wealth transfer to a run-of-the-mill refinancing. If a borrower refinances the senior of two mortgages, the replacement mortgage is newer than the old junior mortgage, making the old junior mortgage now the senior one. So this principle hands the old junior mortgage a large transfer from the entering mortgage without regard to whether the entering mortgage would make the old junior mortgage better off, even without this transfer, which it presumably would if it simply lowered the first mortgage’s coupon.

Countervailing the time-priority doctrine is the doctrine of equitable subrogation, also known as legal subrogation. This principle is articulated in §7.6(a) of American Law Institute (1997):

One who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Even though the performance would otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage, they are preserved and the mortgage retains its priority in the hands of the subrogee.<sup>5</sup>

By this principle, which is explicated in depth in Nelson and Whitman (2006), Yoo (2011), and Been, Howell and Willis (2012), the refinancing mortgage inherits the refinanced mortgage’s seniority, with or without subordination agreements from any intervening liens, provided the replacement of the old mortgage with the new does not disadvantage the lienholders.

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<sup>4</sup> Schmudde (2004), p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> American Law Institute (1997), p. 508.

The principle of equitable subrogation is not automatically incorporated into the laws of individual states. The state legislatures and judiciaries choose whether to incorporate it. An example of a state that chooses not to is Minnesota. This is spelled out in, for example, an Appeals Court decision filed July 26, 2005:

Jurisdictions around the country have adopted three different approaches in determining whether to apply equitable subrogation under circumstances in which a third party holds a lien on the property at the time the second lender pays off the former encumbrance. The first approach reasons that actual knowledge of an existing lien precludes the application of equitable subrogation, but constructive knowledge does not. *See, e.g., Osterman v. Baber*, 714 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The second approach bars the application of equitable subrogation when the party seeking subrogation possesses either actual or constructive notice of an existing lien. *See, e.g., Harms v. Burt*, 40 P.3d 329, 332 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).

The third approach, adopted by the Restatement, disregards actual or constructive notice and concentrates on whether the junior lienholder will be prejudiced by subrogation. *See* Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 (1997). Under the Restatement, a mortgagee will be subrogated when it pays the entire loan of another as long as the mortgagee "was promised repayment and reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage being discharged, and if subrogation will not materially prejudice the holders of intervening interests in the real estate." *Id.*

Minnesota has adopted the second approach (actual or constructive notice of an existing lien bars equitable subrogation) with the added criterion that when a sophisticated party – such as a professional lender – is seeking subrogation, it will be held to a higher standard for the purpose of determining whether it has acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact in failing to duly investigate prior liens.<sup>6</sup>

In the language of the court, actual notice of a lien means a lender actually knew of it, whereas constructive notice means the lien was properly and promptly registered, so the lender could have known about it. So in Minnesota, a refinancing lender does not inherit the seniority of the refinanced mortgage with respect to an intervening mortgage he knew or could have known about, unless the holder of the intervening lien agrees.

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<sup>6</sup> State of Minnesota in Court of Appeals A04-1962, available online at: <http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/ctappub/0507/opa041962-0726.htm>.

The complete distribution of relevant state law, as of September 17, 2008, is reported in Table 1. In this table, “Restatement” indicates that the state courts have effectively adopted the principal of equitable subrogation as spelled out in the Restatement (American Law Institute (1997)), excerpted above. As the table indicates, states that have not adopted the Restatement wholesale exhibit various nuances in the positions they do take. In our empirical tests we do not attempt to capture these nuances; instead we simply contrast the Restatement states with the others. We denote the Restatement states as having “easy” subrogation laws, and the other states as “not easy.”<sup>7</sup> The geographic distribution of these states is presented as Figure 2, which shows them to be widely dispersed across the country.

The empirical question we address is whether the blocking power imparted to the second lienholders by the absence of equitable subrogation reduces the incidence of refinancing. It is worth noting that this reduction could occur several ways. It could result from frictions when second lienholders with limited information bargain for rents. For example, a lender unable to distinguish between the various borrowers asking for subordination might make them all the same take-it-or-leave-it offer, which some would leave. Similarly, lenders or borrowers with some information might yet overplay their hands. Alternatively, failure could result from borrowers struggling to contact or even identify their current lenders or from lenders being willing but unable to subordinate due to contractual restrictions or complications, perhaps arising from securitization agreements. A servicer might also simply have too much paperwork or other time-consuming labor to pay it the proper attention. So it is some combination of these and related hazards peculiar to states without equitable subrogation that we hypothesize to reduce the incidence of refinancing.

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<sup>7</sup> We include the District of Columbia as an easy subrogation state, but our results are robust to this coding.

### 3. Data Description

The dataset consists of mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007, from the LPS Mortgage Dataset. The LPS dataset consists of mortgages serviced by most of the top 10 servicers and covers about two-thirds of all mortgages currently outstanding or originated in recent years. Approximately 4 million of these loans were matched to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/ Equifax Consumer Credit Panel, a database of consumer credit bureau records, based on loan characteristics at origination. The matching procedure is described in more detail in Elul et al. (2010). The importance of this matching for evaluating the effect of equitable subrogation laws is that it provides information on other (second) mortgages held by the same borrower because these mortgages appear in bureau records.

From the LPS data, we obtain first-mortgage characteristics such as origination FICO score, interest rate, LTV ratio, etc. We also update the LTV using the most current balance on the mortgage and the Corelogic zip code level house price index. From the consumer credit bureau data, we obtain the borrower's updated Equifax risk score and information about second mortgage balances.

For those mortgages that terminate (55% of the sample), we use the bureau data to determine whether this termination took place through a refinancing.<sup>8</sup> A terminated mortgage is identified as a refinancing if the borrower did not move in a one-year window spanning the mortgage termination date (based on the address in credit bureau records) *and* a new mortgage account appears in the bureau data with an opening date that is within three months of the

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<sup>8</sup> Haughwout et al (2011) use a similar procedure to identify refinancings.

mortgage termination date.<sup>9</sup> For our final sample, approximately one-half of all terminations are identified as refinancings, which is consistent with the findings of Clapp et al. (2001).

We restrict the sample to those residences that had active and nondelinquent first mortgages as of December 2008 (and if a second mortgage exists, it must also be current). In order to create a more uniform dataset, we also restrict attention to prime, owner-occupied conventional first mortgages, with balances greater than \$100,000, and to “primary” Equifax panel members (for whom data are available in every quarter).<sup>10</sup> Table 2 summarizes the matched database along a number of dimensions. It also provides the same statistics for a random sample of mortgages from the LPS data that were not matched to the FRBNY/Equifax data, to help gauge whether the matching procedure biases the sample in any way.

The comparison between mortgage refinancings in easy and not-easy states drives the identification in the empirical tests. To document how the mortgages themselves compare, Table 3 separates the matched sample into easy vs. not-easy states and reports the mortgage characteristics in each.

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<sup>9</sup> The new mortgage must further have a balance that is at least 90% that of the old mortgage just before termination; we also allow the refinancing mortgage to be a second mortgage in case the legal environment affects how the bureaus code the mortgages. We tested this algorithm out-of-sample on mortgage originations in LPS (for which there is a refinancing flag) and found that it identifies approximately 80% of all refinancings at origination. Conversely, we correctly identify about 75% of all purchase loans at origination.

<sup>10</sup> See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for further detail on the FRBNY/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel.

#### 4. An Illustrative Model of Refinancing

We now present a simple model to illustrate how the effect of subrogation law varies across CLTV regions. Assume that a homeowner has a first and second mortgage, with balances  $F_1$  and  $F_2$  and gross interest rates  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ , respectively, and that they mature on the same future date. So mortgage  $i$  can be paid down for  $F_i$  today or  $F_i R_i$  at maturity. Assume also that the home's market value is currently  $V_0$  and that its value at maturity will be  $V = V_0 + \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon$  follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation  $\sigma$ , and furthermore that the homeowner's valuation is and will be identical to the market valuation. Assume finally that if a mortgage goes into foreclosure, any current lender suffers a cost  $c$  in addition to any losses from recoveries falling short of the balance owed. This cost represents both labor and legal costs and any regulatory attention attracted by the loan's failure.

Suppose a new lender enters this economy, one willing to lend to refinance one or both mortgages, provided he at least breaks even in expectation. As we show in the appendix, the effect of the subrogation regime on this potential refinancing is in one parameter region, the region where the lender would earn an expected profit from refinancing the first mortgage at its current rate  $R_1$ , but an expected loss from refinancing both mortgages at their collective current rate  $(F_1 R_1 + F_2 R_2) / (F_1 + F_2)$ . In this region, the only gains from trade are from refinancing just the first mortgage, with the second mortgagee's cooperation.

Figure 3 illustrates the solution to this model for a particular parameter vector,  $(F_1, R_1, R_2, V_0, \sigma, c) = (80, 1.10, 1.12, 150, 50, 10)$ , with  $F_2$  ranging from 10 to 100 to capture the effect of rising CLTV. When CLTV is low, we see that refinancing either the first mortgage or both at current rates is profitable, so the first mortgage will be refinanced, one way or another. When CLTV is in the middle, refinancing only the first mortgage is profitable, so this is the region

where the second's cooperation, if the law requires it, adds value. When CLTV is high, neither refinancing is profitable, so the first mortgage will not be refinanced, with or without cooperation. The figure illustrates the dynamics defining the middle range: The line representing the first mortgage hits zero at a higher CLTV than does the line representing both, since the former bends down due to the rising expected foreclosure cost, whereas the latter bends down due to *both* the rising expected foreclosure cost *and* the falling expected recovery, and thus hits zero sooner.

The model is too stylized to identify the bounds for our tests, but it does provide some intuition: The lower bound reflects the recovery and foreclosure risks of the combined mortgages, and the upper bound reflects just the foreclosure risk, given the prevailing uncertainty over future house prices. Uncertainty was high in our sample period, so we set the lower bound a little below the standard 80% cutoff, at 75%, and the upper bound close to zero home equity at 95%.

## 5. Empirical Tests

The test design is a probit model where each observation is a homeowner with a first mortgage and the dependent variable indicates whether the homeowner's first mortgage was refinanced in 2009.<sup>11</sup> More formally, for homeowner  $i$ , let  $Easy_i$  be a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower lives in an "easy" state that facilitates equitable subrogation, i.e., one listed as having adopted the Restatement in Table 1, and 0 otherwise. Since there is potentially other cross-state variations that could affect the likelihood of refinancing (including, for example, other state laws), we also include state fixed effects. Let  $D_{ij}$  be a dummy variable

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<sup>11</sup> We obtain similar results with a logit regression.

indicating whether homeowner  $i$  lives in state  $j$ , and let  $D_i$  denote the vector of all these dummy variables for  $i$ .  $Second_i$  is equal to 1 if the homeowner also has a second mortgage. Recall that the homeowner's combined CLTV can be in the low, medium, or high region. Let  $CLTV_{M,i}$  be a dummy variable indicating whether homeowner  $i$  falls in the medium CLTV region, and let  $CLTV_{H,i}$  indicate whether he is in the high CLTV region.<sup>12</sup> Finally,  $X_i$  is a vector of other characteristics (for example, credit score, interest rate, etc., as described below).

Then under the probit model, the probability of homeowner  $i$  refinancing is:

$$\begin{aligned}
& Prob(refinance_i | Easy_i, Second_i, CLTV_{M,i}, CLTV_{H,i}, X_i, D_i) \\
&= \Phi \left[ X_i \beta_X + Second_i \beta_{Second} + CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{CLTV,M} + CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{CLTV,H} \right. \\
&+ (Second_i \times CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV,M} + Second_i \times CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV,H}) \\
&+ (Easy_i \beta_{Easy} + Easy_i \times X_i \beta_{Easy \times X} + Easy_i \times Second_i \beta_{Easy \times Second} \\
&+ (Easy_i \times CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{Easy \times CLTV,M} + Easy_i \times CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{Easy \times CLTV,H}) \\
&+ (Easy_i \times Second_i \times CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{Easy \times Second \times CLTV,M} + Easy_i \times Second_i \\
&\times CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{Easy \times Second \times CLTV,H})) \\
&+ \sum_j (\beta_{D \times j} + X_i \beta_{X \times j} + Second_i \beta_{Second \times j} + CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{CLTV,M \times j} \\
&+ CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{CLTV,H \times j} + Second_i \times CLTV_{M,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV,M \times j} \\
&+ Second_i \times CLTV_{H,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV,H \times j}) D_{ij} \left. \right]
\end{aligned}$$

Since the law governing subrogation in the case of refinancing is state law, the coefficients are not identified in general. The key identifying restrictions we make are that  $\beta_{Second \times CLTV,M \times j} = 0$  and  $\beta_{Second \times CLTV,H \times j} = 0$ . Loosely speaking, what we assume is that the

<sup>12</sup> The low CLTV region does not need to be included because of collinearity.

incremental effect on refinancing of having both a second mortgage and being in the middle CLTV region relative to having just one of these depends on the state of residence only through the subrogation law. This identifying restriction allows us to estimate the three-way interaction coefficients of interest:  $\beta_{Easy \times CLTV, M \times Second}$  and  $\beta_{Easy \times CLTV, H \times Second}$ . In addition, we also assume that  $\beta_{Second \times j} = 0$  so that we can estimate  $\beta_{Easy \times Second}$ ; as we discuss below, this coefficient captures the interaction between the subrogation law and the second mortgage indicator in the low CLTV region. We also drop one state fixed effect so that we can identify  $\beta_{Easy}$ , i.e. we take  $\beta_{j'} = 0$  for one  $j'$ . Finally, to minimize the number of explanatory variables, we assume that  $\beta_{CLTV, M \times j} = 0$ ,  $\beta_{CLTV, H \times j} = 0$ ,  $\beta_{X \times j} = 0$ , and  $\beta_{Easy \times X} = 0$ .

Thus, the model we estimate is:

$$\begin{aligned}
& Prob(\text{refinance}_i | \text{Easy}_i, \text{Second}_i, \text{CLTV}_{M,i}, \text{CLTV}_{H,i}, X_i, D_i) \\
&= \Phi[X_i \beta_X + \text{Easy}_i \beta_{Easy} + \text{Second}_i \beta_{Second} + \text{CLTV}_{M,i} \beta_{CLTV, M} + \text{CLTV}_{H,i} \beta_{CLTV, H} \\
&+ (\text{Second}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{M,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV, M} + \text{Second}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{H,i} \beta_{Second \times CLTV, H}) \\
&+ \text{Easy}_i \times \text{Second}_i \beta_{Easy \times Second} \\
&+ (\text{Easy}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{M,i} \beta_{Easy \times CLTV, M} + \text{Easy}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{H,i} \beta_{Easy \times CLTV, H}) \\
&+ (\text{Easy}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{M,i} \times \text{Second}_i \beta_{Easy \times CLTV, M \times Second} + \text{Easy}_i \times \text{CLTV}_{H,i} \\
&\times \text{Second}_i \beta_{Easy \times CLTV, H \times Second}) + \sum_{j \neq j'} D_{ij} \beta_{D \times j}
\end{aligned}$$

The independent variables include standard mortgage and borrower characteristics from the LPS dataset (e.g., initial LTV and FICO score) observed at origination. We also estimate the CLTV as of December 2008, dividing the sum of first and second mortgage balances (from the LPS and bureau data, respectively) by an estimate of the current house price. The latter is obtained by updating the house value at origination with the change in the ZIP-code level house

price index since origination. And the homeowner's second mortgage balance is from the bureau data.<sup>13</sup> We control for several other likely influences on refinancing, all dated December 2008: the county-level unemployment rate (from the BLS), the current mortgage interest rate (from LPS), and the updated Equifax risk score (from the bureau data), as well as whether the borrower has a second mortgage. In order to capture the wide variety of cross-state differences, we also include state fixed effects.<sup>14</sup> Since we also include a dummy variable for "easy" refinancing states, we omit one state fixed effect.

To operationalize the prediction that the blocking power is strongest in the medium range of CLTV, we sort observations by CLTV into low, medium, and high buckets.<sup>15</sup> The medium range is a CLTV ratio from 75% to 95%; the low range is below that, and the high range is above.

To motivate our analysis, we begin by presenting the incidence of refinancing in 2009 in Table 4, sorted by the presence of a second mortgage and by CLTV range. This table gives a sense of the relevant three-way interaction, i.e., whether residing in an easy state makes refinancing more likely when there is a second mortgage and the CLTV ratio is in the middle range.

The table shows an interaction in the predicted direction. In the low and high CLTV ranges, there is little marginal impact from being in an easy state on the effect of a second mortgage on the likelihood of refinancing. That is, in the low range, the presence of a second mortgage associates with a 0.6 percentage point higher probability of refinancing in the not-easy states (17.4% with a second mortgage, versus 16.8% without), and 0.9 percentage point higher in

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<sup>13</sup> This may be from either closed-end home equity installment loans or revolving home equity lines of credit.

<sup>14</sup> The results were not materially affected by omitting these.

<sup>15</sup> See also Elul et al. (2010), where CLTV buckets are used in a model of mortgage default and interacted with other borrower characteristics.

the easy states (16.2% versus 15.3%). In the high CLTV range, it associates with a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the refinancing probability in not-easy states and a 0.4 percentage point decrease in the easy states. By contrast, in the middle CLTV range, the effect of being in an easy state on the effect of a second mortgage on refinancing is strongly positive (13.6% versus 11.5%), whereas in the not-easy states it is actually slightly negative.

For a formal hypothesis test, we now estimate the probit model described above. The results are in Table 5.

Before getting to the key test statistics, it is worth noting that the variables capturing the benefit of refinancing to the homeowner have the expected signs.<sup>16</sup> Loans with higher interest rates are more likely to be refinanced, as are mortgages with larger balances. Fixed-rate loans, as well as ARMS with long fixed periods, are more likely to be refinanced than ARMS with short fixed-rate periods. Other explanatory variables also enter as expected: Loans with high risk scores (either the FICO score at origination or the Equifax risk score as updated in December 2008,) are more likely to be refinanced, and subprime loans are less likely to be refinanced, as are higher-LTV loans.<sup>17</sup> Loans with balances above the conforming loan limit as of December 2008 (i.e., \$417,000) are less likely to be refinanced, reflecting the tighter underwriting conditions since the financial crisis began.

We now turn to the variables at the center of our analysis: the presence of a second mortgage, the state legal environment, and the CLTV ratio. Being in a higher CLTV range is associated with a lower refinancing probability (relative to the omitted category of CLTV<75%.) Borrowers with second mortgages are more likely to refinance, most likely so that they can roll

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<sup>16</sup> See Elul (2012) for further discussion of the determinants of refinancing and how they have changed over time.

<sup>17</sup> In addition, 40-year mortgages are less likely to be refinanced, as these loans were typically taken out by riskier, liquidity-constrained borrowers. By contrast, 30-year mortgages are more likely to refinance (relative to the omitted category, 15-year) reflecting the borrower benefit.

both mortgages into a single, new loan. The coefficient on easy subrogation laws is negative, but it cannot be interpreted independently of the state fixed effects.

Finally, consider the interaction terms that are at the heart of our analysis. First, the two-way interaction between the second mortgage indicator and easy subrogation laws is insignificant. Since we also include a three-way interaction with the middle and high CLTV regions, as discussed below, this two-way interaction actually captures the effect of subrogation law on borrowers with second mortgages in the low CLTV region. The fact that it is insignificant is consistent with our model, which only predicts a significant effect for the middle CLTV region. The three-way interactions between the CLTV category, the second mortgage indicator, and easy subrogation laws are also consistent with our earlier predictions. The interaction with the middle CLTV region is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction with the high CLTV region is insignificant.

To help interpret these results, in Panel B of this table we compute the marginal effect of a second mortgage on the probability of refinancing. It is only in the middle CLTV region that there is a significant difference in the impact of a having a second mortgage between the easy and not-easy states: In the easy subrogation states, borrowers with second mortgages are 2.9 percentage points more likely to refinance in 2009, whereas in the not-easy states the marginal effect of a second mortgage is only 1.6 percentage points. This constitutes a significant increase in the probability of refinancing, as compared with the average refinancing probability for 2009 of 12%.

## **6. Summary and Conclusion**

This paper addresses the conflicting legal principles at stake when a homeowner wishes to refinance the senior of multiple mortgages. It does so by relating the incidence of refinancing to both the cross section of state legal environments and mortgage circumstances. The key finding is that those states that resolve the conflict by allowing the second mortgage to block the refinancing show significantly less such refinancing. This is a potentially significant barrier to refinancing whose economic significance is heightened by today's historically low rates.

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
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**Figure 1**  
**Mortgage Rates and New Refinancings: 2008-2010**



**Figure 2**

**Geographic Distribution of Easy Subrogation States**

# States With Easy Subrogation Laws





Figure 3

Model of Mortgage Refinancing: Numerical Example



**Table 1****Cross Section of State Law Pertaining to Subrogation of Mortgages**

This table was compiled by Dale Whitman and was current as of September 17, 2008. The following notes were included with the table: "Restatement" indicates the court would grant subrogation even if the refinancing lender had actual knowledge of the intervening lien. "Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge" indicates the court would grant subrogation if the refinancing lender had only constructive notice from the recording of the intervening lien but would not do so if the refinancing lender had actual knowledge of it. "No if actual or constructive notice" indicates that the court would not grant subrogation if the refinancing lender had either actual knowledge of the intervening lien or constructive notice from the recording of the intervening lien.

<b>State</b>	<b>Legal position</b>	<b>Controlling case</b>	<b>Notes and comments</b>
Alabama (AL)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	In re Hubbard, 89 B.R. 920 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1988)	
Alaska (AK)	Restatement	Rush v. Alaska Mortg. Group, 937 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1997)	Technically not a subrogation case, since prior lender and refinancing lender were the same.
Arizona (AZ)	Restatement	Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.3d 542 (Ariz.App.2004)	
Arkansas (AR)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	United States v. Hughes, 499 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.1974)	
California (CA)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Feldsher, 42 Cal.App.4th 41, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 542 (1996)	
Colorado (CO)	Restatement (?)	Hicks v. Londre, 125 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005); AmeriquestMortg. Co. v. Land Title Ins. Corp., 2007 WL 2128203 (Colo.App. 2007).	Ct indicated it might not grant subrog under Rest. to a sophisticated commercial lender
Connecticut (CT)	No if actual or constructive notice	Independence One Mortg. Corp. v. Katsaros, 43 Conn.App. 71, 681 A.2d 1005 (1996)	
Delaware (DE)	Unclear; probably yes if constr. Notice, no if actual knowledge	Stoeckle v. Rosenheim, 10 Del.Ch. 195, 87 A. 1006 (Del.Ch. 1913)	
Dist. Of Columbia (DC)	Restatement (?)	Eastern Savings Bank, FSB, v. Pappas, 829 A.2d 953 (D.C.2003);	The ct. cited Rest. favorably but did not decide whether to follow the Rest. in an actual knowledge case, as there was none here.
Florida (FL)	Restatement	Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat'l Bank of Florida, 792 So.2d 1222 (Fla. App.2001)	Technically not a subrogation case, since prior lender and refinancing lender were the same.

Georgia (GA)	Not if actual or constructive notice	McCollum v. Lark, 187 Ga. 292, 200 S.E. 276 Ga. 1938	
Hawaii (HI)	Unclear; court's analysis is too cursory.	Strouss v. Simmons, 66 Haw. 32, 657 P.2d 1004 (Hawaii,1982)	
Idaho (ID)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First Security Bank, 94 Idaho 489, 491 P.2d 1261 (1971)	
Illinois (IL)	No if actual or constructive notice	Mortgage Electronics Registration Systems, Inc. v. Phylactos, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6295 (N.D. Ill. 3/ 30/05)	But Illinois has been extremely liberal in finding an agreement, leading to "conventional subrogation."
Indiana (IN)	Restatement	Bank of New York v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644 (Ind.2005)	
Iowa (IA)	Restatement	Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa App.1989)	
Kansas (KS)	No if actual or constructive notice	National City Mortg. Co. v. Ross, 117 P.3d 880 (Kan.App.2005)	
Kentucky (KY)	Unclear (but it is clear that court would not allow subrog. if refi lender had actual knowledge)	Minix v. Maggard, 652 S.W.2d 93 (Ky.App.1983)	
Louisiana (LA)	No subrogation in favor of a refinancing mortgagee	Pelican Homestead Ass'n v. Security First Nat. Bank, 532 So.2d 397 (La.App.1988)	Louisiana will not grant subrogation if the old first mortgage has been discharged of record.
Maine (ME)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	United Carolina Bank v. Beesley, 663 A.2d 574 (Me.1995)	
Maryland (MD)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Citibank Federal Savings Bank. v. New Plan Realty Trust, 748 A.2d 24 (Md.App.2000)	
Massachusetts (MA)	Restatement	East Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 428 Mass. 327, 701 N.E.2d 331 (1998)	
Michigan (MI)	No subrog.in absence of fraud, mistake, or misconduct by the lender being subordinated.	AmeriquestMortg. Co. v. Alton, 271 Mich.App. 660 (Mich.App.2006)	The Michigan cases are a conflicting mess. Other recent MI cases reject Restatement; see Washington Mut. Bank v. ShoreBank Corp., 703 N.W.2d 486 (Mich.App.2005). No Sup.Ct. case.
Minnesota (MN)	No if actual or constructive notice	Ripley v. Piehl, 700 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.App.2005) (based on much older Sup.Ct. cases.)	
Mississippi (MS)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Moore, 185 So. 253 (Miss.1939)	

Missouri (MO)	No if actual or constructive notice	184 Miss. 283, 185 So. 253	
Montana (MT)	No case law	Miss. 1939.	
Nebraska (NE)		American National Bank v. Clark, 660 N.W.2d 530 (Neb.App.2003)	Ostensibly based on "conventional subrogation."
Nevada (NV)	Restatement	Houston v. Bank of America, 78 P.3d 71 (Nev.2003)	
New Hampshire (NH)	Unclear; probably yes if constr. notice, no if actual knowledge	Hammond v. Barker, 61 N.H. 53, 1881 WL 4658 (N.H. 1881)	No modern case law.
New Jersey (NJ)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	First Union National Bank v. Nelkin, 808 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2002)	
New Mexico (NM)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	In re Beltramo, 367 B.R. 825, 2007 WL 1307917 (Bkrcty.D.N.M.2007)	A bankruptcy court predicting NM law.
New York (NY)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Gerenstein v. Williams, 23 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App.Div.2001)	
North Carolina (NC)	No if actual or constructive notice	First Union Nat'l Bank v. Lindley Laboratories, Inc., 510 S.E.2d 187 (N.C.App.1999)	
North Dakota (ND)			
Ohio (OH)	Unclear	First Union Nat. Bank v. Harmon, 2002 WL 1980705 (Ohio App.2002) follows Rest.; contra, see IndyMac Bank v. Bridges, --- N.E.2d ---, 2006 WL 3095774 (Ohio App. 2006); Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Aultman, 876 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio App.2007)	Unclear whether actual knowledge by lender would have denied subrogation.
Oklahoma (OK)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Internal Revenue Service, 134 P.3d 913 (Okla.Civ.App.2006)	Remanded for determination as to whether refinancing mortgagee exercised due diligence in determining existence of intervening lien.
Oregon (OR)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Rusher v. Bunker, 99 Or.App. 303, 782 P.2d 170 (Or.App.1989); Dimeo v. Gesik, 993 P.2d 183 (Or.App.1999)	In Dimeo, ct remanded for finding as to whether lender's reliance on erroneous final title report was negligent.
Pennsylvania (PA)	No subrogation in favor of a refinancing mortgagee	1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.2008)	The Superior Ct. likes the Rest. but can't adopt it because of old precedent, which treats all refi lenders as "volunteers."
Rhode Island (RI)	No case law		
South Carolina (SC)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.	Pee Dee State Bank v. Prosser, 367 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 1988)	

South Dakota (SD)			
Tennessee (TN)	Apparently no subrog.in absence of fraud or mistake by the lender being subordinated	Restatement	Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003)
Texas (TX)		Restatement	Farm Credit Bank v. Ogden, 886 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.App.1994)
Utah (UT)	No if actual or constructive notice		Richards v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah App.1993)
Vermont (VT)	Unclear		No modern cases
Virginia (VA)	No if actual or constructive notice		Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. North American Mortg. Co., 559 S.E.2d 870 (Va.2002)
Washington (WA)		Restatement	Bank of America v. Prestance Corp., 2007 WL 1631420 (Wash. 2007)
West Virginia (WV)	No case law		
Wisconsin (WI)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.		Pierner v. Computer Resources & Technology, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 388 (Wis.App.1998)(unpub); Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Williams, 305 Wis.2d 772, 741 N.W.2d 474 (Wis.App.2007)
Wyoming (WY)	Yes if constructive notice, no if actual knowledge.		Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Steamboat Springs, 144 P.3d 1224 (Wyo.2006)
			There are several earlier Texas cases taking the same view as early as 1969.
			The <i>Pierner</i> court does not discuss the effect of actual knowledge, as there was none. The opinion is very liberal, and the ct. may yet adopt the Rest.

**Table 2**  
**Data Description and Comparison with Unmatched Sample**

The column labeled “Matched Sample Mean” characterizes the mortgages in the sample resulting from the match of LPS data with FRBNY/Equifax data. The column labeled “Unmatched Sample Mean” characterizes a random sample of mortgages drawn from the LPS data, but not matched to the FRBNY/Equifax data.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Matched Sample Mean</u>	<u>Unmatched Sample Mean</u>
Refinanced in 2009	0.12	
Easy Subrogation State	0.24	0.25
<b><u>First Mortgage Characteristics (at Orig.)</u></b>		
FICO Score @ Origination	722	725
Loan Amt.	\$246,692	\$251,736
LTV @ Orig.	73.34	72.13
First Mortgage Origination Yr.		
	2003	0.12
	2004	0.15
	2005	0.22
	2006	0.20
	2007	0.31
Fixed rate	0.85	0.82
ARM		
24-mon. fixed period	0.00	0.01
36-mon.	0.01	0.01
60-mon.	0.08	0.10
84-mon.	0.03	0.03
120-mon.	0.03	0.03
Term		
180-mon	0.09	0.09
360-mon.	0.90	0.90
480-mon.	0.01	0.01
"Investor"		
Portfolio	0.07	0.07
GSE	0.75	0.75
Private Securit.	0.18	0.18
<b><u>As of Dec 2008</u></b>		
Second Mortgage	0.31	
Second Mortgage Balance (conditional on having a second)	\$57,744	
Combined LTV	85.48	
Cty Unemp. Rate (%)	7.00	7.09
First Mortgage Int. Rate (%)	6.02	6.03
Updated Equifax Risk Score	741	
Jumbo Principal Bal. on 1st (Dec. 2008)	0.10	

**Table 3**  
**Mortgage Statistics: Easy vs. Not-Easy States**

The column labeled “Not-Easy State” reports the average for the portion of the matched sample representing mortgages of properties in not-easy states, as defined in the text. The column “Easy State” addresses the easy states.

		<b>Not- Easy State</b>	<b>Easy State</b>
Refinanced		0.13	0.11
FICO @ Orig.		722	719
LTV @ Orig.		72.92	75.31
Origination Year	2003	0.12	0.11
	2004	0.15	0.14
	2005	0.22	0.22
	2006	0.20	0.21
	2007	0.30	0.32
FRM		0.84	0.87
ARM fixed period (months)	24	0.00	0.00
	36	0.01	0.01
	60	0.08	0.07
	84	0.03	0.03
	120	0.03	0.02
Term (months)	180	0.09	0.08
	360	0.90	0.91
	480	0.01	0.01
Investor:	GSE	0.75	0.78
	Private Securitization	0.19	0.15
	Portfolio	0.07	0.06
Unemployment Rate		7.02	6.91
Jumbo		0.11	0.07
Balance (\$)		253,009	228,040
Updated Equifax Risk Score		743	735
Second Mortgage		0.31	0.28
Interest Rate (%)		6.01	6.06
CLTV $\leq$ 75		0.36	0.31
CLTV $\in(75,95]$		0.32	0.31
CLTV $>$ 95		0.32	0.38
N		294,454	91,084

**Table 4**  
**Refinancing Rate by CLTV, State Law, and Second Mortgage (2009)**

**Low CLTV Range (CLTV<75)**

	Not Easy	Easy
No Second	16.82%	15.33%
Second	17.35%	16.22%

**Middle CLTV Range (75≤CLTV<95)**

	Not Easy	Easy
No Second	13.77%	11.46%
Second	13.46%	13.56%

**High CLTV Range (CLTV≥95)**

	Not Easy	Easy
No Second	8.31%	6.24%
Second	7.15%	5.83%

**Table 5**  
**Probit Model of Refinancing (2009)**

This table reports the output from a Probit model in which each observation is a residence with a first mortgage and the dependent variable indicates that the first mortgage was refinanced in 2009. There are 303,964 observations, and “\*\*” indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. State fixed effects are included but not reported. Panel A contains the Probit results, showing both coefficients and marginal effects. Panel B uses the Panel A interaction results to report the marginal effect of the presence of a second mortgage on the probability of refinancing.

**Panel A**

	<b>Coeff.</b>	<b>SE</b>		<b>Marginal</b>
Easy Subrog.	-0.055	0.088		-0.011
FICO @ Orig.	0.001	0.000	**	0.000
LTV @ Orig.	-0.002	0.000	**	0.000
Origination Year: 2004	0.133	0.013	**	0.021
2005	0.083	0.012	**	0.013
2006	0.279	0.014	**	0.048
2007	0.329	0.013	**	0.058
Investor: Private Securitization	-0.132	0.011	**	-0.023
Portfolio	-0.247	0.015	**	-0.041
ARM Fixed Period (months): 24	-0.343	0.079	**	-0.051
36	-0.193	0.042	**	-0.031
60	0.101	0.013	**	0.019
84	0.123	0.018	**	0.024
120	0.082	0.019	**	0.015
Term: 360	0.110	0.012	**	0.019
480	-0.046	0.042		-0.007
Second Mort.	0.075	0.012	**	0.018
Unemp. Rate (Dec. 2008)	-0.022	0.002	**	-0.004
Int. Rate	0.218	0.007	**	0.040
Jumbo (Dec. 2008)	-0.526	0.016	**	-0.096
ln (loan amt.)	0.303	0.009	**	0.055
Updated Equifax Riskscore (Dec. 2008)	0.004	0.000	**	0.001
CLTV $\in$ (75,95]	-0.228	0.011	**	-0.048
CLTV>95	-0.679	0.016	**	-0.112
CLTV $\in$ (75,95]&Second Mort.	0.007	0.018		
CLTV>95&Second Mort.	0.067	0.020	**	
Second Mort. & Easy Subrog.	-0.010	0.029		
CLTV $\in$ (75,95]&Easy Subrog.	-0.030	0.020		
CLTV>95&Easy Subrog.	-0.017	0.027		
CLTV $\in$ (75,95]&Second Mort.&Easy	0.084	0.041	**	
CLTV>95&Second Mort.&Easy	0.037	0.044		

**Panel B**

	<b>Marginal</b>	<b>SE</b>
CLTV $\leq$ 75&Not Easy Subrog.	0.018	0.003
CLTV $\leq$ 75&Easy Subrog.	0.015	0.006
CLTV $\in(75,95]$ &Not Easy Subrog.	0.016	0.003
CLTV $\in(75,95]$ &Easy Subrog.	0.029	0.005
CLTV $>$ 95&Not Easy Subrog.	0.017	0.002
CLTV $>$ 95&Easy Subrog.	0.018	0.004

### Appendix: Illustrative Model

Because the borrower's valuation is identical to the market valuation, the borrower will repay his mortgage or mortgages in full on the maturity date if the market value  $V$  is greater than the balance due, and will otherwise give up the house to foreclosure. So absent any refinancing, there are three cases:

- If  $V > F_1R_1 + F_2R_2$ , the first and second mortgagees are paid in full.
- If  $F_1R_1 < V < F_1R_1 + F_2R_2$ , the first mortgagee is paid in full, the second mortgagee suffers a recovery loss, and both mortgagees pay the foreclosure cost  $c$ .
- If  $V < F_1R_1$ , the first mortgagee suffers a recovery loss, the second mortgagee is wiped out, and both mortgagees pay the foreclosure cost  $c$ .

Given the assumption that  $V = V_0 + \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon$  is  $N(0, \sigma)$ , the first mortgagee's expected repayment, net of foreclosure costs, which we denote  $E_1$ , is

$$E_1 = (1 - \Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 - V}{\sigma}\right))F_1R_1 + \Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 - V}{\sigma}\right)\left(V_0 - \frac{\sigma\varphi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 - V}{\sigma}\right)}{\Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 - V}{\sigma}\right)}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 + F_2R_2 - V}{\sigma}\right)c$$

Since the new lender needs only to break even in expectation, it follows that if  $E_1 > F_1$ , there exists an  $R < R_1$  such that the lender would refinance the first mortgage at rate  $R$ , and this would make the borrower better off, since his repayment at maturity would be lower. It would also make the second mortgagee better off, since the balance senior to him would be lower, and the probability of foreclosure would be lower.

We can similarly determine whether the new lender would refinance both mortgages. Let  $R_B = (F_1R_1 + F_2R_2)/(F_1 + F_2)$ , i.e., the interest rate on both mortgages put together. If the new

lender refinanced both mortgages at this rate, the borrower's repayment at maturity would be unchanged, and the new lender's expected repayment, which we denote  $E_B$ , would be

$$E_B = (1 - \Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 + F_2R_2 - V_0}{\sigma}\right))(F_1R_1 + F_2R_2) + \Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 + F_2R_2 - V_0}{\sigma}\right)\left(V_0 - \frac{\sigma\varphi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 + F_2R_2 - V_0}{\sigma}\right)}{\Phi\left(\frac{F_1R_1 + F_2R_2 - V_0}{\sigma}\right)} - c\right)$$

If  $E_B > F_1 + F_2$ , then there exists an  $R < R_B$  such that the lender would refinance both mortgages at  $R$ , and the borrower would be better off.

Therefore, the parameter region where the first mortgage is refinanced if and only if the second mortgage cooperates is where  $E_1 > F_1$  and  $E_B < F_1 + F_2$ . To illustrate this parameter region, Figure 2 plots  $E_1/F_1 - 1$  ("first," the blue line) and  $E_B/(F_1 + F_2) - 1$  ("both," the red line) for the parameter vector indicated in the text.