Profit Sharing: A Contracting Solution to Harness the Wisdom of the Crowd

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Wisdom of the crowd

Wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki (2005))

- the collective opinion of a group of individuals
- often found to dominate the judgment of a single expert

Why does it exist? How prevalent is it?

- individual judgments often contain idiosyncratic noises
  - ▷ averaging tends to cancel out these noises (law of large numbers)
- rooted in classic economic thoughts
  - ▷ Hayek (1944, 1945), Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)
- useful for modern settings (e.g. earnings forecast, crowdfunding)
  - ▷ Da and Huang (2015), Brown and Davies (2015), Chemla and Tinn (2016), Xu (2016), etc.

This paper (assuming the existence of the wisdom of the crowd effect):

- how to best harness it? e.g. via "smart" contract design?

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An illustrative example

Two investors, Alice & Bob, participate in funding a risky, scalable project

- independently decide how much money to commit to the project
  – based on their optimal return–risk trade-off
- deep pocketed; identically risk averse

Both investors use their private information to guide investment decisions

- each investor's private information contains idiosyncratic noises
- neither investor has access to the other's private information

Q: How should Alice and Bob divide up any payoff from their investment?

How should Alice and Bob divide up the payoff?

The typical approach (common stock)

- rewards investors in proportion to their initial investment
- the more Alice has invested, the larger payoffs she will enjoy

But...is this really optimal?

- **winner's curse**: risk-aversion limits investment amount

$\Rightarrow$ call for better risk sharing than common stocks

What if, Alice and Bob **equally** divide up any net payoff?

- i.e. profit sharing for harnessing the wisdom of the crowd!

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Common stock vs. profit sharing

Assume that *net* return is realized as 10% ↑

Common stock

	Inv.Amt	Shr.G.	Gross payoff	Individual payoff
A	\$200	2/3	(\$200 + \$100)×	\$330 × 2/3 = \$220
B	\$100	1/3	(1 + 10%) = \$330	\$330 × 1/3 = \$110

Fifty-fifty profit sharing (assume no changes in investment)

	Shr.N.	Inv.Amt	Net payoff	Individual payoff
A	1/2	\$200	(\$200 + \$100)×	\$200 + \$30 × 1/2 = \$215
B	1/2	\$100	10% = \$30	\$100 + \$30 × 1/2 = \$115

A bad deal for A? Optimal investment also changes under profit sharing...

- not necessarily a bad deal to get a smaller piece of a bigger pie!

Common stock vs. profit sharing: illustration

Common stock
(i.e. no profit-sharing)



Fifty-fifty profit sharing
(assume no investment change)



Common stock vs. profit sharing: illustration

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

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

Assume that *net* return is realized as 10% ↑
A bad deal for A to go fifty-fifty?

Common stock vs. profit sharing: illustration

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

Fifty-fifty profit sharing
(investment optimally changes)



Not necessary...if A gets a smaller piece of a bigger pie!

Formal analysis of the illustrative example

Two deep-pocketed, identically risk averse investors ($i \in \{A, B\}$)

- maximize constant absolute risk aversion utility: $u(W) = -e^{-\rho W}$

The risky (scalable) prior with *net* return denoted as a random variable $\tilde{r}$

- investor i's private signal $s_i = r + \epsilon_i$

  where r is the realization of $\tilde{r}$, $\epsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_i^{-1})$, $\epsilon_i \perp\!\!\!\perp \tilde{r}$, $\epsilon_A \perp\!\!\!\perp \epsilon_B$

Optimal Investment under common stock

Investor i's problem: invest x_i' given s_i s.t.

$$x_i'(s_i) = \text{argmax}_x \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\rho \tilde{r} x} | s_i]$$

Assume $\tilde{r} \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{r}, \tau_r^{-1})$ for ease of exposition, RHS leads to

$$\begin{aligned} x_i'(s_i) &= \text{argmax}_x - e^{-\rho \mathbb{E}(\tilde{r}|s_i)x + \frac{1}{2}\text{Var}(\tilde{r}|s_i)\rho^2 x^2} \\ &= \frac{1}{\rho}(\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_i s_i) \end{aligned}$$

If A and B could exchange private information before making investing decisions...

Then investor i knew both s_i and s_{-i}, and

$$x_i'(s_i, s_{-i}) = \text{argmax}_x \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\rho \tilde{r} x} | s_A, s_B]$$

RHS leads to

$$\begin{aligned} x_i'(s_A, s_B) &= \text{argmax}_x - e^{-\rho \mathbb{E}(\tilde{r}|s_A,s_B)x + \frac{1}{2}\text{Var}(\tilde{r}|s_A,s_B)\rho^2 x^2} \\ &= \frac{1}{\rho}(\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_A s_A + \tau_B s_B) \end{aligned}$$

(full information benchmark)

Optimal Investment if A and B agree to share profits equally

Investor i's problem: invest x_i given s_i s.t.

$$x_i(s_i) = \text{argmax}_x \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\rho \frac{1}{2} \tilde{r}[x+\tilde{x}_{-i}(s_{-i})]} | s_i]$$

$\because$ the RHS involves i's belief of $\tilde{x}_{-i}(s_{-i})$

- solution constitutes a Nash equilibrium

Definition

A Nash Equilibrium under an equal division of profits consists of two investment strategy functions $x_A(\cdot)$ and $x_B(\cdot)$ such that

$$x_i(s_i) = \text{argmax}_x \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\rho \frac{1}{2} \tilde{r}[x+\tilde{x}_{-i}(s_{-i})]} | s_i],$$

where $i \in \{A, B\}$ and $-i = \{A, B\} \backslash \{i\}$.

Solving the Nash equilibrium

Nash Equilibrium (from the Definition)

$$x_i(s_i) = \text{argmax}_x \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\rho \frac{1}{2} \tilde{r}[x+\tilde{x}_{-i}(s_{-i})]} | s_i], \tag{1}$$

Guess and verify a linear Nash equilibrium

$$\begin{aligned} x_i(s_i) &= \alpha + \beta_i s_i \\ (1) \Rightarrow \alpha + \beta_i s_i &= \text{argmax}_x - \mathbb{E}[e^{[-\frac{1}{2}\rho\tilde{r}][x+\alpha+\beta_{-i}\tilde{s}_{-i}]} | s_i] \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Both $-\frac{1}{2}\rho\tilde{r}$ and $x + \alpha + \beta_{-i}\tilde{s}_{-i}$ are normal r.v.-s conditional on s_i

$\Rightarrow$ expectation in the RHS of (2): m.g.f of a (general) χ^2-r.v.

- a closed-form expression exists

Profit sharing harnesses crowd wisdom

Under fifty-fifty profit sharing:

$$\begin{cases} x_i &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + 2\tau_i s_i)/\rho \\ x_{-i} &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + 2\tau_{-i} s_{-i})/\rho \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow i\text{'s payoff: } r(x_i + x_{-i})/2 = r(\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_A s_A + \tau_B s_B)/\rho$$

If A and B exchange private information before investing

$$x_i'(s_i, s_i) = x'_{-i}(s_i, s_i) = (\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_A s_A + \tau_B s_B)/\rho$$

$$\Rightarrow i\text{'s payoff: } r x_i'(s_i, s_i) = r(\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_A s_A + \tau_B s_B)/\rho$$

Theorem

$\forall\{r, s_A, s_B\}$, *each investor's payoff under an equal division of profits always equals to that under a full information benchmark.*

Why does profit sharing harness crowd wisdom?

Compare optimal investor behaviors:

- under common stock:

$$\begin{cases} x_i' &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_i s_i)/\rho \\ x_{-i}' &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + \tau_{-i} s_{-i})/\rho \end{cases}$$

- under fifty-fifty profit sharing:

$$\begin{cases} x_i &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + 2\tau_i s_i)/\rho \\ x_{-i} &= (\tau_r \bar{r} + 2\tau_{-i} s_{-i})/\rho \end{cases}$$

General case: optimal profit-sharing

Consider n investors each with risk-aversion ρ_i and receiving a_i of the profit

Theorem (equilibrium existence and structure)

Iff the pre-agreed profit ratio is proportional to risk tolerance, i.e.

$$a_i = \frac{1/\rho_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} 1/\rho_i},$$

a Nash equilibrium exists, under which each investor's payoff is equal to what is under a full information benchmark.

Optimal sharing rule is easy to implement (only requires risk-aversions)

- individuals also have strict incentives to truthfully report their ρ_i-s

Implications for crowdfunding security design

In May 2016, the SEC further sanctioned investment crowdfunding

- under Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act
- entrepreneurs directly solicit funding from a large number of investors
- contracts agreed to at the time of investment specify monetary payoffs

Q1: What type of contract is optimal? Still an open question.

- currently common stock, debt, or hybrids are all used in practice

Wisdom of the crowd: an acclaimed benefit of crowdfunding

- extensively discussed from the entrepreneur's perspective:
- aggregate investment provides useful information to the entrepreneur

Q2: Could the wisdom of the crowd also benefit investors themselves?

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Investment crowdfunding platforms...

How robust is our main result? I

Empirically, only a small number of entrepreneurial ventures take off while most others fail – returns may be skewed...

$\Rightarrow$ our result is intact under skewed project returns

Theorem (Arbitrary distributions of project return)

$\forall$ arbitrary distributions of project return $\tilde{r}$ and an exponential family likelihood function of $\tilde{r}$ given private signals $s_i, i \in \{A, B\}$, profit sharing gives the same payoff for both investors as in a full-information benchmark.

How robust is our main result? II

Sensible to assume endowed private information in crowdfunding

- how will results change if private information has be costly acquired?
- a free-riding problem (Holmström (1982)) in information acquisition?
- e.g. assume constant marginal cost in acquiring signal precision

$\Rightarrow$ free-riding not large enough to cancel out the wisdom of the crowd

Theorem (Costly Information Acquisition)

With a constant marginal cost in acquiring private signal precision, investors strictly prefer more participants in profit sharing.

How robust is our main result? III

Sensible to assume constant return to scale for crowdfunding projects

- how will results change for projects with (dis)economies of scale?
- e.g. assume total investment influences net return $\tilde{r} - \lambda(x_1 + x_2)$

$\Rightarrow$ the profit-sharing contract derived above is still *first-best* optimal

Theorem (Projects with (dis)economy of scale)

The first-best allocation chosen by an omniscient and benevolent social planner could be sustained by a Nash equilibrium under profit sharing plus some cash transfers, even if the project features (dis)economy of scale.

A Second Welfare Theorem under externality and asymmetric information?

A few further thoughts

Explain the structures of partnership firms?



Guide the design of Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO)?
Or alternative financing such as initial coin offering (ICO)?

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

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

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