Parameter Bias in an Estimated DSGE Model: Does Nonlinearity Matter?

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Abstract

How can parameter estimates be biased in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that omits nonlinearity in the economy? To answer this question, we simulate data from a fully nonlinear New Keynesian model with the zero lower bound constraint and estimate a linearized version of the model. Monte Carlo experiments show that significant biases are detected in the estimates of monetary policy parameters and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates. These biases arise mainly from neglecting the zero lower bound constraint rather than linearizing the equilibrium conditions. The estimated impulse responses to a monetary policy shock are significantly different from the true responses. However, regarding the responses to shocks to the discount factor and productivity, the biased parameters contribute to making the differences small.

Keywords: Nonlinearity, Zero lower bound, DSGE model, Parameter bias, Bayesian estimation

JEL Classification: C32, E30, E52

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1 Introduction

Following the development of Bayesian estimation and evaluation techniques, many economists have estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models using macroeconomic time series. In particular, estimated New Keynesian models, which feature nominal rigidities and monetary policy rules, have been extensively used by policy institutions such as central banks. Most of the estimated DSGE models are linearized around a steady state because a linear state-space representation along with the assumption of normality of exogenous shocks enables us to efficiently evaluate likelihood using the Kalman filter. However, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2005) and Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Santos (2006) demonstrate that parameter estimates, the level of likelihood, and the moments based on a linearized model can be significantly different from those based on its nonlinear counterpart. Moreover, in the context of New Keynesian models, Basu and Bundick (2012), Braun, Körber, and Waki (2012), Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), Gavin, Keen, Richter, and Throckmorton (2015), Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012), Nakata (2013a, 2013b), and Ngo (2014) emphasize the importance of considering nonlinearity in assessing the quantitative implications of the models when the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate is taken into account.

Despite the existence of these studies, attempts to estimated DSGE models in a fully nonlinear and stochastic setting are still limited. A few exceptions are Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2005), who estimate a neoclassical growth model in a nonlinear form,\textsuperscript{1} and Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012), who estimate a fully nonlinear New Keynesian DSGE model in which the ZLB constraint is occasionally binding. The reason for scarcity of such attempts is probably due to high computational costs for the estimation of nonlinear models. To evaluate the likelihood function in a nonlinear setting, one needs to rely on a nonlinear solution method and a particle filter, both of which require iterative procedures, and their computational expense grows rapidly with an increase in the dimensionality of problems.

In this paper, we examine how and to what extent the parameter estimates can be biased in an estimated DSGE model when nonlinearity existing in the economy is omitted in the estimation process. If significant biases were detected, it would urge researchers to be equipped with nonlinear estimation techniques at any computational costs. Otherwise, it would at least assure practitioners that the common practice of estimating linearized models could lead to reliable estimates. To this

\textsuperscript{1}Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) estimate a real business cycle model with investment-specific technological change, preference shocks, and stochastic volatility, using a second-order perturbation method.
end, we solve a fully nonlinear New Keynesian model that incorporates the ZLB constraint using a projection method and simulate artificial time series from the nonlinear model. The parameters calibrated in this data-generating process (DGP) are regarded as true values. Then, using the simulated data, a Monte Carlo experiment is conducted, in which a log-linearized version of the model is estimated without imposing the ZLB. In the estimation, we employ Bayesian methods, which are now extensively used to estimate DSGE models. We set the prior means equal to the true parameter values and assess the parameter biases from neglecting the nonlinearity by comparing the posterior means and credible intervals with the true values. Moreover, we compare the estimated impulse response functions with the true ones to investigate to what extent the dynamic properties of the estimated model can differ from those of the true nonlinear model.

The analysis in this paper is an extension of Hirose and Inoue (2015), who conduct a similar experiment using the data simulated from a New Keynesian model in which nonlinearity is considered only in a monetary policy rule to incorporate the ZLB constraint but the remaining equilibrium conditions are linearized. While Hirose and Inoue (2015) point to parameter bias only resulting from omitting the ZLB, the present paper is able to investigate the bias arising from missing nonlinearities regarding both the ZLB and the other equilibrium conditions.

Our main results are summarized as follows. In the baseline experiment, while the estimates of the structural parameters related to preferences and nominal rigidities are not biased, significant biases are detected in the estimates of the monetary policy parameters and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates. We show that these biases arise for the most part from missing the ZLB constraint rather than linearizing the equilibrium conditions. With the true parameter values, the impulse response functions of the linearized model are substantially different from those of the nonlinear model. Because of the biased parameters, the differences between the estimated and true responses increase in response to a monetary policy shock. However, we find that the biased parameters can make the differences small for shocks to the discount factor and productivity. We also demonstrate that the biases in the parameter estimates increase if the true parameter values in the DGP are altered so that the frequency of binding at the ZLB and the average duration of ZLB spells increases. Nevertheless, the increased biases in the parameter estimates do not necessarily amount to larger differences between the estimated and true impulse responses.

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2 Hirose and Inoue (2015) simulate the model using the solution algorithm of Erceg and Lindé (2014) and Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Gust (2013). In their algorithm, if the model-implied nominal interest rate falls below zero, a sequence of contractionary monetary policy shocks is added in both the current and anticipated periods so that the contemporaneous and expected interest rates at the lower bound are zero.
A technical contribution of this paper is that the DGP used in our experiment has, to the best of our knowledge, the richest dynamic structure of all the New Keynesian models with the ZLB constraint solved in a fully nonlinear and stochastic setting. To make our test economy realistic enough, we incorporate habit persistence in consumption preferences, price indexation of intermediate-good firms, and monetary policy smoothing into a standard New Keynesian model.\(^3\) In solving the model, we apply the efficient algorithm for the Smolyak-based projection methods using the unidimensional disjoint sets of grid points developed by Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014) to alleviate the computational burden associated with the increased number of state variables.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model used in our analysis and a nonlinear solution method. Section 3 explains our Monte Carlo experiments and presents our results. Section 4 conducts a robustness analysis with alternative parameter settings. Section 5 is the conclusion.

2 The Model and Solution Method

This section describes the DGP used in our analysis. The DGP is characterized by a fully nonlinear New Keynesian DSGE model with the ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate. The nonlinear model is solved using a Smolyak algorithm in the context of a projection method.

2.1 The Model

In the model economy, there are households, perfectly competitive final-good firms, monopolistically competitive intermediate-good firms that face price stickiness, and a central bank. For empirical validity, the model features habit persistence in consumption preferences, price indexation to recent past and steady-state inflation, and monetary policy smoothing.

Each household \( h \in [0, 1] \) consumes final goods \( C_{h,t} \), supplies labor \( L_{h,t} \) to intermediate-good firms, and purchases one-period riskless bonds \( B_{h,t} \) so as to maximize the utility function

\[
E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \prod_{k=1}^{t} d_k \right)^{-1} \left[ \frac{(C_{h,t} - \gamma C_{t-1})^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - L_{h,t} \right]
\]

\(^3\)While most of the existing studies that solve nonlinear New Keynesian models with the ZLB consider models with the simplest lag structure and a limited number of shocks, Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) and Maliar and Maliar (2015) solve extended models with monetary policy smoothing and a variety of structural shocks. However, their models do not incorporate consumption habit or price indexation of firms.
subject to the budget constraint

\[ P_tC_{h,t} + B_{h,t} = P_tC_{h,t} + R_{t-1}B_{h,t-1} + T_{h,t}, \]

where \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the subjective discount factor, \( \sigma > 0 \) is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \) is the degree of external habit persistence in consumption preferences, \( P_t \) is the price of final goods, \( W_t \) is the real wage, \( R_t \) is the gross nominal interest rate, and \( T_{h,t} \) is the sum of a lump-sum public transfer and profits received from firms. Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), a shock to the discount factor \( d_t \) affects the weight of the utility in period \( t + 1 \) relative to the one in period \( t \). The log of the discount factor shock follows an AR(1) process:

\[ \log d_t = \rho_d \log d_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{d,t}, \]

where \( \rho_d \in [0, 1] \) is an autoregressive coefficient and \( \varepsilon_{d,t} \) is a normally distributed innovation with mean zero and standard deviation \( \sigma_d \). The first-order conditions for optimal decisions on consumption, labor supply, and bond-holding are identical among households and therefore become

\[ \Lambda_t = (C_t - \gamma C_{t-1})^{-\sigma}, \]

\[ W_t = \frac{1}{\Lambda_t}, \]

\[ \Lambda_t = \frac{\beta}{\Delta_t} \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t+1} \frac{R^n_t}{\Pi_{t+1}}, \]

where \( \Lambda_t \) is the marginal utility of consumption and \( \Pi_t = P_t/P_{t-1} \) denotes gross inflation.

The representative final-good firm produces output \( Y_t \) under perfect competition by choosing a combination of intermediate inputs \( \{Y_{f,t}\} \) so as to maximize profit \( P_t Y_t - \int_0^1 P_{f,t} Y_{f,t} df \) subject to a CES production technology \( Y_t = \left( \int_0^1 Y_{f,t}^{\theta-1} df \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \), where \( P_{f,t} \) is the price of intermediate good \( f \) and \( \theta > 1 \) denotes the elasticity of substitution. The first-order condition for profit maximization yields the final-good firm’s demand for intermediate good \( f \), \( Y_{f,t} = (P_{f,t}/P_t)^{-\theta} Y_t \), while perfect competition in the final-good market leads to \( P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{f,t}^{1-\theta} df \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \).

Each intermediate-good firm \( f \) produces one kind of differentiated good \( Y_{f,t} \) under monopolistic competition by choosing a cost-minimizing labor input \( L_t \) given the real wage \( W_t \) subject to the production function

\[ Y_{f,t} = A_t L_{f,t}, \]

where \( A_t \) represents total factor productivity. The log of the productivity level follows an AR(1) process:

\[ \log A_t = \rho_a \log A_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{a,t}, \]
that reoptimize their prices in the current period then maximize expected profit 

\[ MC_t = \frac{W_t}{A_t}. \] (6)

In the face of the final-good firm’s demand and marginal cost, the intermediate-good firms set the prices of their products on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983). In each period, a fraction \( 1 - \xi \in (0, 1) \) of intermediate-good firms reoptimize their prices while the remaining fraction \( \xi \) indexes prices to a weighted average of past inflation \( \Pi_{t-1} \) and steady-state inflation \( \bar{\Pi} \). The firms that reoptimize their prices in the current period then maximize expected profit

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \xi^j \beta^j \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} d_k \right)^{-1} \frac{\lambda_{t+j}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \frac{P_{f,t}}{P_{t+j}} \prod_{k=1}^{j} (\Pi_{t+k-1}^t \bar{\Pi}^{1-t}) - MC_{t+j} \right] Y_{f,t+j}
\]

subject to the final-good firm’s demand

\[
Y_{f,t+j} = \left[ \frac{P_{f,t}}{P_{t+j}} \prod_{k=1}^{j} (\Pi_{t+k-1}^t \bar{\Pi}^{1-t}) \right]^{-\theta} Y_{t+j},
\]

where \( \iota \in [0, 1) \) denotes the weight of price indexation to past inflation relative to steady-state inflation. The first-order condition for the reoptimized price \( P_t^o \) is given by

\[
P_t^o = \theta \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \xi^j \beta^j \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} d_k \right)^{-1} \frac{\lambda_{t+j}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+k-1}^t \bar{\Pi}}{\Pi_{t+k}^t} \right)^{\iota} \bar{\Pi} \right)^{-\theta} MC_{t+j} Y_{t+j} \right]}{\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \xi^j \beta^j \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} d_k \right)^{-1} \frac{\lambda_{t+j}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+k-1}^t \bar{\Pi}}{\Pi_{t+k}^t} \right)^{\iota} \bar{\Pi} \right)^{1-\theta} Y_{t+j} \right]}.
\]

Let \( S_t = \theta \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \xi^j \beta^j \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} d_k \right)^{-1} \frac{\lambda_{t+j}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \prod_{k=1}^{j} \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+k-1}^t \bar{\Pi}}{\Pi_{t+k}^t} \right)^{\iota} \bar{\Pi} \right)^{-\theta} MC_{t+j} Y_{t+j} \right] \) and \( F_t = (\theta - 1) Y_t \). Then, \( S_t \) and \( F_t \) can be written in the following recursive forms:

\[
S_t = \theta MC_t Y_t + \xi \frac{\beta}{d_t} \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+1}^t}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{\Pi}{\bar{\Pi}} \right)^{-\iota} \right]^\theta S_{t+1}, \tag{7}
\]

\[
F_t = (\theta - 1) Y_t + \xi \frac{\beta}{d_t} \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_{t+1}^t}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{\Pi}{\bar{\Pi}} \right)^{-\iota} \right]^{1-\theta} F_{t+1}. \tag{8}
\]

Moreover, the final-good’s price \( P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{f,t}^{1-\theta} df \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \) can be rewritten as

\[
1 = (1 - \xi) \left( \frac{S_t}{F_t} \right)^{1-\theta} + \xi \left( \frac{\Pi}{\bar{\Pi}} \right)^{\theta-1} \left( \frac{\Pi_{t-1}^t}{\Pi} \right)^{-(\theta-1)} . \tag{9}
\]
The final-good market clearing condition is

\[ Y_t = C_t, \quad (10) \]

while the labor market clearing condition leads to

\[ \frac{Y_t \Delta_t}{A_t} = \int_0^1 L_{f,t} df = L_t, \quad (11) \]

where \( \Delta_t = \int_0^1 (P_{f,t}/P_t) \theta df \) represents price dispersion across the intermediate-good firms. Under the present pricing rule, the price dispersion evolves according to

\[ \Delta_t = (1 - \xi) \left( \frac{S_t}{F_t} \right)^{-\theta} + \xi \left( \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^\theta \left( \frac{\Pi_{t-1}}{\Pi} \right)^{-\theta} \Delta_{t-1}. \quad (12) \]

A monetary policy rule is specified as

\[ R_t = \max \left[R^*_t, 1\right], \quad (13) \]

where

\[ R^*_t = \left( R^*_{t-1} \right)^{\phi_r} \left[ \bar{R} \left( \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}} \right)^{\phi_y} \right]^{1-\phi_r} \exp(\varepsilon_{r,t}). \quad (14) \]

\( R^*_t \) denotes the hypothetical interest rate that the central bank would set according to a Taylor (1993) type monetary policy rule where \( \phi_r \in [0, 1) \) is the policy-smoothing parameter, \( \phi_\pi \geq 0 \) and \( \phi_y \geq 0 \) are the degrees of interest rate policy response to inflation and output, and \( \bar{R} \) and \( \bar{Y} \) are the steady-state gross nominal interest rate and output. \( \varepsilon_{r,t} \) is a monetary policy shock, which is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation \( \sigma_r \). \( R_t = R^*_t \) if \( R^*_t \geq 1 \) or the ZLB is not imposed. In the case of \( R^*_t < 1 \), \( R_t = 1 \) because the gross nominal interest rate cannot be lower than one.

An equilibrium is given by the sequence \( \{Y_t, C_t, W_t, L_t, A_t, MCT_t, S_t, F_t, \Pi_t, \Delta_t, R_t, R^*_t, \delta_t, A_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfying the equilibrium conditions (1)–(14).

2.2 Parameter Setting

The model is parameterized according to standard choices in the literature to make our test economy as representative as possible.

The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \) is set at 1.5. The habit persistence and price indexation parameters (\( \gamma, \iota \)) are both set at 0.5. These three values follow from the prior means used in Smets and Wouters (2007). As is often calibrated in the New Keynesian literature, we set the Calvo parameter \( \xi = 0.75 \), which implies that the average duration of prices is four quarters.
The monetary policy parameters \((\phi_\pi = 2.0, \phi_\nu = 0.5)\) that represent the degrees of interest rate response to inflation and output are larger than the coefficients in the original Taylor (1993) rule, reflecting the recent literature in which the estimation of New Keynesian DSGE models leads to interest rate responses to inflation larger than 1.5.\(^4\) Moreover, the larger degrees of the policy response are required to ensure the convergence of the nonlinear solution for broader sets of model parameters. The policy-smoothing parameter \(\phi_r\) is set at 0.5.

The steady-state gross inflation rate \(\Pi\) is set at 1.005, so that the central bank’s target inflation rate is two percent annually. The inverse of the subjective discount factor \(\beta\), which is equivalent to the steady-state gross real interest rate, is set at 1.0025, following the prior mean in Smets and Wouters (2007). The resulting steady-state nominal interest rate is three percent annually. This is almost the same as the average of the three-month Treasury bill rate in the post-1990 US sample.

The AR(1) coefficients for the shocks to the discount factor and productivity \((\rho_d, \rho_a)\) are both set at 0.7. The standard deviations of these shocks \((\sigma_d, \sigma_a)\) are both 0.003 while a relatively small value is assigned to that of the monetary policy shock \((\sigma_r = 0.001)\). These parameter values are determined so that the nominal interest rate is bounded at zero for substantial periods in a simulated sample.

### 2.3 Solution Method

The model has four endogenous state variables (lagged output \(Y_{-1}\), the inflation rate \(\Pi_{-1}\), the hypothetical nominal interest rate \(R^*_{-1}\), and price dispersion \(\Delta_{-1}\)) and three exogenous shocks (the discount factor shock \(d\), the productivity shock \(A\), and the monetary policy shock \(\varepsilon_r\)).\(^5\) The policy functions satisfying the equilibrium conditions can be written as

\[
S = h(S_{-1}, \tau),
\]

where \(S_{-1} = (Y_{-1}, \Pi_{-1}, R^*_{-1}, \Delta_{-1})\) and \(\tau = (d, A, \varepsilon_r)\).

The policy functions are computed using the time-iteration method with a Smolyak algorithm in the context of a projection method. Below is a brief description of the computational procedure, and the details are explained in the Appendix. To solve for the policy functions on each grid point \((S_{-1}, \tau)\), first we approximate each AR(1) process of the exogenous shocks \(\tau\) using Markov

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\(^4\)See, for instance, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010).

\(^5\)Time subscripts are omitted in this section and in the Appendix as the policy functions are time-independent objects.
chains. For each individual shock process, we use the method proposed by Rouwenhorst (1995) to determine the grid points and transition matrix for the Markov chain. Seven discrete values are chosen for the discount factor and productivity shocks, and five values are chosen for the monetary policy shock, so that the total number of grid points for the exogenous variables is $N_\tau = 245$.

Given the exogenous shock processes, we solve for the policy function $h(S_{-1}, \tau)$ using a Smolyak algorithm as in Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015). While Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) use a standard Smolyak method laid out in Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011), we apply a more efficient algorithm developed by Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014). Specifically, we compute the unidimensional disjoint sets of grid points of the endogenous variables $S_{-1}$ and projection functions onto the grid points with interpolation coefficients and a Chebyshev family of orthogonal basis functions. In each iteration of the time-iteration method, the policy functions are evaluated at future state $(S, \tau')$, which may be off the grid points. The grid points obtained by the Smolyak algorithm are sparse; therefore the algorithm is more likely to be free from the curse of dimensionality. We use the level of approximation $\mu = 2$ so that the total number of grid points is $N = 41$. This number is much smaller compared with the one obtained by a product of the maximum number of grid points in each dimension, $\tilde{N} = 5^4 = 625$. The Appendix shows that our solution method is very accurate, albeit with the reduced number of grid points.

As in Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012), we do not approximate $h(S, \tau')$ directly, as the ZLB on the nominal interest rate generates kinks in the policy functions. Instead, we introduce an indicator function regarding the interest-rate regime and changes of variables so that the policy functions are smoother and easier to converge. In particular, our algorithm does not rely on any numerical solvers, which makes computation more reliable in finding an equilibrium.

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6Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012) use a tensor product of Chebyshev basis functions, as they have only three endogenous state variables by assuming Rotemberg pricing instead of Calvo pricing for modeling price stickiness.

7Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014) point out that evaluations of repeated basis functions used in the conventional Smolyak algorithm is quite costly. To obtain the interpolation coefficients, they use a Lagrange interpolation method instead of the original closed-form formula used in Malin, Krueger, and Kubler (2011).

8The level of approximation $\mu = 2$ is also used in Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015). They document that their algorithm fails to converge with the benchmark parameters when they increase $\mu$ from 2 to 3.
3 Monte Carlo Experiments

In this section, we conduct Monte Carlo experiments to examine how the parameter estimates can be biased if the nonlinearity is omitted in the estimation process. Then, we analyze the effects of these parameter biases on the model properties by comparing the estimated impulse responses with those based on the true model.

3.1 Design

Our Monte Carlo experiments proceed as follows. First, we generate an artificial time series of output (deviation from the steady state), inflation, and the nominal interest rate from the DGP as described in the previous section, given the parameter values presented in Section 2.2. Thus, the simulated series can be regarded as those that reflect the nonlinearity of the model economy including the ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate. Each simulated sample consists of 200 observations, corresponding to quarterly observations over a period of 50 years. This sample size is chosen because it is comparable to the size with which many researchers estimate DSGE models in practice.

Next, using the simulated data, we estimate a linearized version of the model. Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (1)–(14) around the steady state and rearranging the resulting equations yields

\[ \tilde{Y}_t = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} E_t \tilde{Y}_{t+1} + \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \tilde{Y}_{t-1} - \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma (1 + \gamma)} \left( \tilde{R}_t - E_t \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} - \tilde{d}_t \right), \]

\[ \tilde{\Pi}_t = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta_t} E_t \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} + \frac{\beta_t}{1 + \beta_t} \tilde{\Pi}_{t-1} + \frac{(1 - \xi) (1 - \xi \beta)}{\xi (1 + \beta_t)} \left[ \frac{\sigma}{1 - \gamma} \tilde{Y}_t - \frac{\sigma \gamma}{1 - \gamma} \tilde{Y}_{t-1} - \tilde{A}_t \right], \]

\[ \tilde{R}_t = \phi_r \tilde{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \phi_r) \left( \phi_y \tilde{\Pi}_t + \phi_y \tilde{Y}_t \right) + \varepsilon_{r,t}, \]

where the variables with \( \tilde{\} \) represent percentage deviations from their steady-state values. From the simulated data, the percentage deviations of output from the steady state 100 log(\( Y_t/\bar{Y} \)), the inflation rate 100 log \( \Pi_t \), and the nominal interest rate 100 log \( R_t \) are assumed to be observable. Then, the observation equations are

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
100 \log(\frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}}) \\
100 \log \Pi_t \\
100 \log R_t
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
0 \\
\tilde{\pi} \\
\tilde{r} + \tilde{\pi}
\end{bmatrix} +
\begin{bmatrix}
\tilde{Y}_t \\
\tilde{\Pi}_t \\
\tilde{R}_t
\end{bmatrix},
\]

\[ \text{10} \]

\[ \text{9} \]The model is simulated for 250 periods, and the first 50 observations are eliminated.
\[ \bar{\pi} = 100 \log \bar{\Pi} \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{rr} = 100 \log \left( 1/\beta \right) \]

are the steady-state inflation rate and the real interest rate in percentage terms, respectively. In the subsequent analysis, \( \bar{\pi} \) and \( \bar{rr} \) are parameters to be estimated, instead of \( \bar{\Pi} \) and \( \beta \).

In the estimation, we employ Bayesian methods. The prior distributions of parameters are presented in the second to fourth columns of Table 1. Each prior mean is set to the corresponding true parameter value used in the DGP. Gamma distributions with a standard deviation of 0.2 are chosen for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \sigma \), the monetary policy reaction parameters \( (\phi_x, \phi_y) \), and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates \( (\bar{\pi}, \bar{rr}) \). Beta distributions with a standard deviation of 0.2 are used for habit persistence \( \gamma \), the Calvo parameter \( \xi \), price indexation \( \iota \), the policy-smoothing parameter \( \phi_r \), and the autoregressive coefficients \( (\rho_d, \rho_a) \). For the standard deviations of the shocks \( (100\sigma_d, 100\sigma_a, 100\sigma_r) \), inverse-gamma distributions with a standard deviation of 2 are assigned. To obtain the posterior distributions, we generate 200,000 draws using the random-walk Metropolis–Hastings algorithm and discard the first 25 percent of these draws.\(^\text{10}\)

These steps are replicated 200 times, and the posterior means and Bayesian credible intervals for the parameters are averaged over the replications. Then, we can evaluate the parameter bias arising from missing the nonlinearity by examining how the resulting posterior means and credible intervals differ from the true parameter values.

According to the simulated sample of 40,000 periods (200 Monte Carlo replications with a sample size of 200 observations) using the baseline parameter setting, the economy is at the ZLB for 9.7 percent of quarters, and the average duration of ZLB spells is 2.8 quarters. These statistics indicate that our model economy is more frequently constrained by the ZLB than the simulation results in the previous studies that employ nonlinear New Keynesian models similar to ours. Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) simulate a model calibrated for the US economy and show that the economy spends 5.5 percent of quarters at the ZLB and that the average duration at the ZLB is 2.1 quarters. Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012) estimate a model in a fully nonlinear setting, and the simulation of their estimated model demonstrates that the economy is at the ZLB for 3.1 percent of quarters and that the average duration of the ZLB spells is about three quarters.\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^{10}\)The scale factor for the jumping distribution in the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm is adjusted so that the acceptance rate of candidate draws is approximately 25 percent.

\(^{11}\)Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012) also document that financial market participants in 2009:Q1 expected a duration of three quarters, on average, for which the federal funds rate would remain at virtually zero.
3.2 Results

3.2.1 Parameter estimates

The fifth to sixth columns in Table 1 (Baseline) present the averages of the posterior means and the 90 percent credible intervals for the estimated parameters in the baseline experiment.

The estimates of the structural parameters ($\sigma$, $\gamma$, $\xi$, $\iota$), which are related to preferences and nominal rigidities, are not biased because the posterior mean estimates are very close to the true parameter values and the 90 percent credible intervals contain the true values. The policy-smoothing parameter $\phi$, the autoregressive coefficients ($\rho_d$, $\rho_a$), and the standard deviations of the shocks ($\sigma_d$, $\sigma_a$, $\sigma_r$) are also not affected substantially by omitting the nonlinearity in the estimation.

However, we detect significant biases in the estimates of the parameters that characterize the degree of a monetary policy response to inflation $\phi_{\pi}$ and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates ($\bar{\pi}$, $\bar{rr}$), in the sense that the mean estimates for these parameters differ from the corresponding true values and that the credible intervals do not include the true values. The estimated monetary policy response to output $\phi_y$ is also substantially biased although its credible interval contains the true value.

For the biased estimates of the monetary policy reaction parameters ($\phi_{\pi}$, $\phi_y$), the same explanation as in Hirose and Inoue (2015) applies. In the DGP, the monetary policy reaction function has a kink where the ZLB constraint becomes binding; that is, the reaction function has positive slopes with respect to inflation and output if the unconstrained nominal interest rate is positive, but the slopes become flat if it turns negative. However, when such a kink is omitted in the estimation, as is the case in our experiment, the estimated slopes are approximated to lie between the positive and flat slopes, and thus these monetary policy parameters can be underestimated.

The downward biases detected in the estimates of the steady-state inflation and real interest rates ($\bar{\pi}$, $\bar{rr}$) are in stark contrast to the result in Hirose and Inoue (2015), who find upward bias in the steady-state real interest rate. In the present analysis, the DGP is characterized by the

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12 Hirose and Inoue (2015) explain the reason for the upward bias in the steady-state real interest rate as follows. The presence of the ZLB forces the nominal interest rate to be equal to or greater than zero. However, if the model estimation fails to consider the ZLB, the nominal interest rate can be negative, and the mean of the model-implied nominal interest rate declines. Then, the estimate of the steady-state nominal interest rate must rise to adjust the difference between the mean of the model-implied nominal interest rate and that of the corresponding series simulated from the DGP with the ZLB, given the model is linearized around the steady state. In their experiment, such an adjustment has mostly emerged as a change in the estimate of the steady-state real interest rate, rather than the steady-state inflation rate.
fully nonlinear model. In such an environment, the stochastic steady state can be substantially different from the deterministic steady state. In particular, once the ZLB constraint is taken into account, the presence of uncertainty can reduce inflation and output by a substantial amount, as emphasized by Nakata (2013a), and hence their levels in the stochastic steady state become lower than those in the deterministic one. In reality, the mean of the inflation rate simulated from the DGP, which is asymptotically equivalent to the stochastic steady-state value, is 0.39 percent while the corresponding deterministic value is calibrated at 0.5. Because the latter is treated as the true value, the discrepancy between the two steady states is adjusted by the lower estimate of $\bar{\pi}$ in our experiment. The nominal interest rate in the stochastic steady state can be either larger or smaller than its deterministic steady-state value. It will be larger if the direct effect of the ZLB constraint is strong. It will be smaller if the feedback effect of reduced inflation and output on the nominal interest rate through the Taylor-type monetary policy rule is dominant. In the present experiment, the mean of the nominal interest rate simulated from the DGP is 0.57 percent, which is much lower than the deterministic steady-state value of 0.75 percent. Consequently, the steady-state real interest rate $\bar{r}$ is underestimated while the downward bias in the estimate of $\bar{\pi}$ partially contributes to filling the gap between the two steady states.

These sources of the parameter biases could potentially affect the estimates of other structural parameters that characterize the dynamic IS equation (15) and the New Keynesian Phillips curve (16) because we employ the system-based estimation approach. However, our experiment indicates that such an effect is quite limited.

### 3.2.2 Which nonlinearity matters?

Our baseline experiment suggests that omitting nonlinearity in estimation leads to substantial biases in parameter estimates. Which missing nonlinearity causes such biases, the ZLB constraint or the nonlinear equilibrium conditions? To answer this question, we conduct two additional Monte Carlo experiments. First, the DGP in the baseline experiment is replaced with the one where the ZLB constraint is not imposed but the other nonlinearities remain unchanged. Second, we consider the DGP where the ZLB constraint is imposed but all the equilibrium conditions are linearized. The latter experiment is comparable to the analysis in Hirose and Inoue (2015) in the sense that the DGP is quasi-linear, although the solution methods are different from each other.\textsuperscript{13}

The first additional experiment assesses to what extent parameter estimates can be biased

\textsuperscript{13}In the present paper, we solve the quasi-linear model using a projection method described in the Appendix. Regarding the solution method employed in Hirose and Inoue (2015), see footnote 2.
if nonlinearities in the equilibrium conditions other than the ZLB constraint are ignored in the estimation. The seventh to eighth columns of Table 1 (No ZLB in DGP) presents the results. The parameter estimates are unbiased in that all the mean estimates are almost the same as the true values. This finding implies that the DGP in this experiment is very close to its linearized counterpart. Thus, omitting nonlinearity in estimation would not affect parameter estimates if the ZLB were not an issue. The second additional experiment is to quantify the effect of omitting solely the ZLB constraint on the parameter estimates. The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 1 (Quasi-linear DGP). As in the baseline experiment, nonnegligible biases are found in the estimates of the monetary policy reaction parameters ($\phi_\pi, \phi_y$) and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates ($\bar{\pi}, \bar{r}$), although the biases are smaller than those in the baseline. Given that the effect of missing nonlinearity in the equilibrium conditions is virtually zero from the first experiment, we can conclude that the biases detected in the baseline experiment are mainly due to ignoring the ZLB constraint rather than linearizing the equilibrium conditions.

To gain more insight about the results, Figure 1 illustrates the policy functions of output $Y_t$, inflation $\Pi_t$, and the nominal interest rate $R_t$ for the range of the state variables, $Y_{t-1}, \Pi_{t-1},$ and $R^{*}_{t-1}$ shown on each horizontal axis. Each panel compares the policy functions of the three DGPs considered above: the nonlinear model with the ZLB (thick solid line in red), the nonlinear model without the ZLB (thin solid line in blue), and the quasi-linear model with the ZLB (dashed lines in black). Two points should be stressed here. First, the policy functions of the nonlinear model without the ZLB appear to be almost linear, indicating that the linear model can approximate well the nonlinear model in the absence of the ZLB. Thus, no biases are detected in the first additional experiment. Second, the policy functions of the nonlinear model with the ZLB and those of the quasi-linear model with the ZLB are very similar to each other and exhibit strong nonlinearities in the panels associated with the nominal interest rate. This is the reason why the substantial biases are found in the estimates of the monetary policy parameters and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates both in the baseline experiment and in the second additional experiment.

### 3.2.3 Impulse responses

From a practical perspective, it is important to investigate to what extent the dynamic properties of the estimated model that omits nonlinearity can differ from those of the true nonlinear model. To

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14The smaller biases indicate that the quasi-linear DGP in this experiment exhibits less nonlinearity than the fully nonlinear DGP in the baseline experiment. This is because nonlinearity is amplified by combining the ZLB constraint with the other nonlinear equilibrium conditions. However, we find such a difference is admittedly small.
examine this issue, we compare the impulse response functions estimated without the nonlinearity with those computed using the true model. Figure 2 depicts the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate to one standard deviation shocks to the (1) discount factor, (2) productivity, and (3) monetary policy. The responses are expressed in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state to exclude the effects of the differences in stochastic steady-state values in each DGP and the biased estimates of steady-state parameters. In each panel, the thick solid (red) line represents the true response, and the thin solid (blue) and dashed (blue) lines are the posterior mean and 90 percent credible interval of the estimated response given the biased parameters, respectively. For comparison, each panel contains the response of the linear model with the true parameters, shown by (black) dots.

Sizeable differences are found between the responses of the linear model with the true parameters and those of the true model. These differences arise from the fact that the policy functions of the nonlinear model with the ZLB constraint are substantially different from those of the linear model without the constraint. In contrast, the mean estimates of the responses become closer to the true responses regarding the shocks to the discount factor and productivity, implying that the biased parameters contribute to partially replicating the true responses to these shocks. For the responses to the monetary policy shock, however, the mean estimates of the responses deviate more from the true ones than the responses of the linear model with the true parameters.

In terms of 90 percent credible intervals, the estimated responses of the interest rate to the productivity shock and those of output and inflation to the monetary policy shock are different from the true responses in that the true responses are outside the credible intervals. Therefore, the dynamic properties of the estimated model without the nonlinearity are no longer the same as those of the true model.

4 Robustness Analysis

According to the DGP in our baseline experiment, the nominal interest rate is bounded at zero for 9.7 percent of quarters, and the average duration of ZLB spells is 2.8 quarters. As the probability of hitting the ZLB increases in the simulated sample, parameter biases due to excluding the nonlinearity in the estimation might become large. To analyze such a possibility, we change the parameters assigned to the DGP so that the model economy is more frequently constrained by the ZLB. We then conduct the same Monte Carlo exercises as the baseline experiment using the data simulated by the DGP with the alternative parameter settings. Specifically, we consider two cases.
One is where the true steady-state real interest rate $\bar{rr}$ falls by 0.03 (0.12 percent annually) so that $\bar{rr} = 0.22$. In this case, the probability of being stuck at the ZLB is 14.8 percent of the simulated sample. The other is where the standard deviation of the discount factor shock $100\sigma_d$ increases from 0.3 to 0.33. In the latter case, the number of zero interest rate periods increases because large negative shocks are more likely to depress the economy and to lower the nominal interest rate, and the model economy is at the ZLB for 14.2 percent of quarters. In both cases, the average duration of ZLB spells is 3.1 quarters, which is longer than that in the baseline experiment.\(^{15}\)

Table 2 presents the averages of the posterior means and the 90 percent credible intervals for the parameters in the two alternative experiments: the case of low $\bar{rr}$ and the case of large $\sigma_d$. In both cases, the biases in the estimates of the monetary policy reaction parameters ($\phi_\pi$, $\phi_y$) and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates ($\bar{\pi}$, $\bar{rr}$), which are found in the baseline experiment (Table 1), become large. In particular, the credible interval for $\phi_y$ no longer includes the true value. Moreover, a significant bias is detected in the estimates of the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock $\sigma_r$. The reason for the upward bias in $\sigma_r$ is straightforward. In the simulated data, the nominal interest rate never falls below zero because the DGP takes account of the ZLB constraint. In the estimation process, however, the model-implied nominal interest rate can be negative, and such a discrepancy must be captured by the monetary policy shock $\varepsilon_r$, which results in the increase in $\sigma_r$. The estimates of the other parameters are almost unbiased, as in the baseline experiment, and hence are robust to the increased probabilities and durations of the ZLB in the DGP.

Figure 3 and 4 show the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate to each one standard deviation shock in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state in the case of low $\bar{rr}$ and the case of large $\sigma_d$, respectively. As in the preceding section, each panel draws the true response, the posterior mean and 90 percent credible interval for the estimated response, and the response of the linear model with true parameters. Compared with the baseline experiment (Figure 2), the differences between the responses of the linear model with true parameters and those of the true nonlinear model become large throughout the figures. As for the differences between the estimated and true responses, the widening differences are found in the responses to the monetary policy shock because of the upward bias in the estimates of its standard deviation $\sigma_r$. However, changes in the differences are limited regarding the responses to the discount factor shock and the productivity shock. Thus, the increased biases in the parameter estimates do not necessarily make the estimated responses deviate further from the true ones.

\(^{15}\)The solutions did not converge if we parameterized the DGP so that the probability of being at the ZLB or the duration of ZLB spells increases more.
5 Concluding Remarks

This paper has investigated parameter bias in an estimated DSGE model that neglects nonlinearity intrinsic to the economy. According to the results in our Monte Carlo experiments, significant biases have been detected in the parameter estimates associated with the monetary policy rule and the steady-state inflation and real interest rates. These biases are caused by ignoring the nonlinearity arising from the ZLB rather than linearizing the equilibrium conditions. We have demonstrated that the estimated impulse response functions can be substantially different from the true ones although the biased parameters partially contribute to making the differences small. These findings are a caution to researchers against the common practice of estimating linearized DSGE models without considering nonlinearity.

Our finding regarding the source of parameter bias indicates that omitting nonlinearity in estimation would not affect parameter estimates if the ZLB was not an issue. However, it might not be the case if the DGP is characterized by a more highly nonlinear model than considered in this paper, such as the one with recursive preferences, state-dependent pricing, or increased uncertainty. Investigating such a possibility is left for future research.
Appendix

To solve for the policy functions on each grid point \((S_{-1}, \tau)\), we follow the approach in Christiano and Fisher (2000) and Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012). We consider the regime-specific policy functions \(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau)\) for \(i = \{1, 2\}\), whose index is associated with the interest-rate regime. Specifically, the policy functions are defined as weighted averages of the regime-specific functions:

\[
Y = h_Y(S_{-1}, \tau) = h_{Y,1}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1\}} + h_{Y,2}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1\}};
\]
\[
\Pi = h_{\Pi}(S_{-1}, \tau) = h_{\Pi,1}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1\}} + h_{\Pi,2}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1\}};
\]
\[
\Delta = h_{\Delta}(S_{-1}, \tau) = h_{\Delta,1}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1\}} + h_{\Delta,2}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1\}};
\]
\[
R^* = h_R(S_{-1}, \tau) = h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1\}} + h_{R,2}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{\{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1\}};
\]

where the regime-specific policy rule is given by

\[
h_{R,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \left(\frac{R^*}{1}\right)^{\phi_i} \left[\frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{Y} \frac{h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{Y}\right] \exp(\varepsilon\tau),
\]
\[
h_{R,2}(S_{-1}, \tau) = 1,
\]

and \(1_{\{D\}}\) is the indicator function that is one if the condition \(D\) is true and zero otherwise. The hypothetical interest rate, \(R^*\), is either above or below the lower bound of \(\bar{R} = 1\). The indexed policy functions do not depend on the current indicator function.

Given the processes of \(\tau\), the regime-specific functions in each regime \(i = 1, 2\) satisfy the following equilibrium conditions:

\[
\frac{1}{W_i(S_{-1}, \tau)} = \beta d^{-1} h_{R,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) \sum_{\tau'} \frac{\Phi(\tau' | \tau)}{W(S, \tau') h_{\Pi}(S, \tau')},
\]
\[
S_i(S_{-1}, \tau) = \theta W_i(S_{-1}, \tau) A^{-1} + \beta d^{-1} \xi \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) \left\{ \left( \frac{h_{\Pi}(S, \tau')}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right)^{-\epsilon} \right\} \frac{W_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{W(S, \tau')} \frac{h_Y(S, \tau')}{h_Y(S_{-1}, \tau)} S(S, \tau'),
\]
\[
F_i(S_{-1}, \tau) = (\theta - 1)
\]
\[
1 = (1 - \xi) \left( \frac{S_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{F_i(S_{-1}, \tau)} \right)^{1-\theta} + \xi \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{\Pi_{-1}}{\Pi} \right)^{-\epsilon} \left( \frac{W_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{W(S, \tau')} \frac{h_Y(S, \tau')}{h_Y(S_{-1}, \tau)} F(S, \tau') \right)^{\theta-1},
\]
\[
h_{\Delta,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = (1 - \xi) \left( \frac{S_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{F_i(S_{-1}, \tau)} \right)^{-\theta} + \xi \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{\Pi_{-1}}{\Pi} \right)^{-\epsilon} \left( \frac{W_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{W(S, \tau')} \frac{h_Y(S, \tau')}{h_Y(S_{-1}, \tau)} F(S, \tau') \right)^{\theta}.\]
where $\Phi(\tau'|\tau)$ is a transition probability from $\tau$ to $\tau'$,

$$W_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \equiv (h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) - \gamma Y_{-1})^\sigma,$$

and $h_{\Pi}(S, \tau'), h_Y(S, \tau'), S(S, \tau'), F(S, \tau')$ and $W(S, \tau')$ are weighted averages of the regime-specific functions in the next period. Note that the regime-specific functions are affected by the possibility that the nominal interest rate can be bounded at zero in the next period. They also depend on the values of the policy functions, $S = h_i(S_{-1}, \tau)$. For example, in the first equation, the future possibility of being at the ZLB enters through $h_{\Pi}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau')$ or $W(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau')$.

Furthermore, as in Gust, López-Salido, and Smith (2012), we apply the following changes of variables

$$V_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \equiv \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau'|\tau) \left\{ \left[ \frac{h_{\Pi}(S, \tau')}{\Pi} \right] \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{h_Y(S, \tau') S(S, \tau')}{W(S_{-1}, \tau) h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)} \right\},$$

$$K_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \equiv \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau'|\tau) \left\{ \left[ \frac{h_{\Pi}(S, \tau')}{\Pi} \right] \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{h_Y(S, \tau') F(S, \tau')}{W(S_{-1}, \tau) h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)} \right\}.$$

We employ the policy function iteration algorithm with initial values of $V_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau), V_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $K_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ on the grid points. The values of $S_i(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $F_i(S_{-1}, \tau)$ are obtained from the values of $W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $K_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ on the grid points in each iteration $j = 1, 2, \ldots, 16$. Therefore, we can solve for the policy functions $h_i(S_{-1}, \tau)$ at each grid point without relying on any numerical solvers. As a result of the changes of variables, the previous equations become

$$S_i(S_{-1}, \tau) = \theta W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) A^{-1} + d^{-1} \beta W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau), \quad (A.1)$$

$$F_i(S_{-1}, \tau) = (\theta - 1) + d^{-1} \beta W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) K_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau). \quad (A.2)$$

Furthermore, the policy functions of $h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ are given by

$$h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \Pi \left( \frac{\Pi_{t-1}}{\Pi} \right)^{t} \left( \xi^{-1} \left[ 1 - (1 - \xi) \left( \frac{S_i(S_{-1}, \tau)}{F_i(S_{-1}, \tau)} \right)^{1-\theta} \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta d}}, \quad (A.3)$$

$$h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)^{1/\sigma} + \gamma Y_{-1}. \quad (A.4)$$

Equations (A.1)-(A.4) imply that there is a one-to-one mapping from $W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{t-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$ and $K_i^{(j-1)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$ to $h_{\Pi,i}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$ and $h_{Y,i}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$. Then the values of $W_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$ and $K_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$.

\textsuperscript{16}For simplicity of notation, we omit the index $j$ from the functions except for $W_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$ and $K_i^{(j)}(S_{t-1}, \tau)$.
and \( K_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) are updated as
\[
W_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \left[ \beta d^{-1} h_{R,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) \sum_{\tau'} \left\{ \frac{\Phi(\tau' | \tau)}{\hat{W}(S; \tau') \hat{h}_{\Pi}(S; \tau')} \right\} \right]^{-1},
\]
\[
V_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \sum_{\tau+1} \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{\hat{h}_{\Pi}(S; \tau')}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right)^{-1} \right]^{\theta} \hat{h}_Y(S; \tau') \right\},
\]
\[
K_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \sum_{\tau+1} \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{\hat{h}_{\Pi}(S; \tau')}{\Pi} \right) \left( \frac{h_{\Pi,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)}{\Pi} \right)^{-1} \right]^{\theta-1} \hat{h}_Y(S; \tau') \right\}
\]
\[
\times \left( (\theta - 1)/\hat{W}(S; \tau') + \beta d^{-1} \xi \hat{K}(S; \tau') \right) \Phi(\tau' | \tau),
\]
where the estimated values of \( \hat{W}(S; \tau') \), \( \hat{V}(S; \tau') \) and \( \hat{K}(S; \tau') \) are used to obtain the values of \( \hat{h}_{\Pi}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau); \tau') \) and \( \hat{h}_Y(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau); \tau') \). To obtain the estimated values, we approximate the functions \( \hat{W}(S; \tau') \approx W^{(j-1)}(S, \tau'), \hat{V}(S; \tau') \approx V^{(j-1)}(S, \tau') \) and \( \hat{K}(S; \tau') \approx K^{(j-1)}(S, \tau') \) for any points in the domain of \( S \) for given \( \tau' \) by a projection method. The values of the approximated functions on the grid points \((S_{-1}, \tau)\) are given by
\[
W^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = W_1^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1} + W_2^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1},
\]
\[
V^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = V_1^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1} + V_2^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1},
\]
\[
K^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = K_1^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) > 1} + K_2^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)1_{h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) \leq 1}.
\]

The algorithm is summarized as follows.

1. \( W_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau), V_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) and \( K_i^{(0)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) are given on each grid point \((S_{-1}, \tau)\) as initial values.

2. \( h_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \) is computed for each regime \( i = 1, 2 \), as the values of \( W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) and \( K_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) are given on each grid point.

3. The estimated values \( \hat{W}(S; \tau'), \hat{V}(S; \tau') \) and \( \hat{K}(S; \tau') \) in the next period are obtained by a projection method.

4. \( \hat{h}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau); \tau') \) is computed for each regime \( i = 1, 2 \) on each grid point \((S_{-1}, \tau, \tau')\).

5. \( W_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau), V_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) and \( K_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \) are updated on each grid point \((S_{-1}, \tau)\) by taking expectations over \( \tau' \).

6. Iterate the procedures 2–5 until the algorithm converges so that \( \| W^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) - W^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \| < \epsilon \), \( \| V^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) - V^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \| < \epsilon \) and \( \| K^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) - K^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) \| < \epsilon \) hold.
Quasi-linear model  The policy functions for the quasi-linear model are solved using the same algorithm above. As the model is approximated at the first order, higher-order price dispersion ceases to exist. Then, the vector of endogenous state variables is reduced to $S_{-1} \equiv (\bar{Y}_{-1}, \tilde{H}_{-1}, \tilde{R}_{-1})$.

The regime-specific policy rule is given by

$$h_{R,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \phi_r \tilde{R}_{-1} + (1 - \phi_r) (\phi_n h_{II,1}(S_{-1}, \tau) + \phi_y h_Y(1, S_{-1}, \tau)) + \varepsilon_r,$$

$$h_{R,2}(S_{-1}, \tau) = -\log \tilde{R}.$$

Given the processes of $\tau$, the regime-specific functions in each regime $i = 1, 2$ satisfy the following equilibrium conditions:

$$h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) \left\{ \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} h_Y(S, \tau') + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma (1 + \gamma)} h_{II}(S, \tau') \right\}$$

$$+ \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \bar{Y}_{-1} - \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma (1 + \gamma)} \left( h_{R,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) - \tilde{d} \right),$$

$$h_{II,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta_t} \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) h_{II}(S, \tau') + \frac{\lambda}{1 + \beta_t} \bar{H}_{-1}$$

$$+ \frac{(1 - \xi) (1 - \xi \beta)}{\xi (1 + \beta_t)} \left[ \frac{\sigma}{1 - \gamma} h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) - \frac{\sigma \gamma}{1 - \gamma} \bar{Y}_{-1} - \bar{A} \right].$$

We define $W_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \equiv h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $V_i(S_{-1}, \tau) \equiv \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) h_{II}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau')$. Given $W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$, we have

$$h_{II,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta_t} V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) + \frac{\lambda}{1 + \beta_t} \bar{H}_{-1}$$

$$+ \frac{(1 - \xi) (1 - \xi \beta)}{\xi (1 + \beta_t)} \left[ \frac{\sigma}{1 - \gamma} W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau) - \frac{\sigma \gamma}{1 - \gamma} \bar{Y}_{-1} - \bar{A} \right], \quad (A.5)$$

$$h_{Y,i}(S, \tau') = W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau). \quad (A.6)$$

There is a one-to-one mapping from $W_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $V_i^{(j-1)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ to $h_{II,i}(S_{-1}, \tau_i)$ and $h_{Y,i}(S_{-1}, \tau)$. Then the values of $W_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ and $V_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau)$ are updated as follows:

$$W_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) \left\{ \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \hat{h}_Y(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau') + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma (1 + \gamma)} \hat{h}_{II}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau') \right\}$$

$$+ \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \bar{Y}_{-1} - \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma (1 + \gamma)} \left( h_{R,i}(S_{-1}, \tau) - \tilde{d} \right),$$

$$V_i^{(j)}(S_{-1}, \tau) = \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau' | \tau) \hat{h}_{II}(h_i(S_{-1}, \tau), \tau'),$$

where $\hat{h}_{II}(S; \tau')$ and $\hat{h}_Y(S; \tau')$ are evaluated from the estimated values of $\hat{W}(S; \tau') \approx W^{(j-1)}(S, \tau')$ and $\hat{V}(S; \tau') \approx V^{(j-1)}(S, \tau')$. 

21
Accuracy of the solutions As we rely on approximation to solve for the policy functions \( h(S_{t-1}, \tau) \), we assess the accuracy of the solutions, following Maliar and Maliar (2015). In each experiment, equilibrium paths are simulated for 40,000 periods \((N = 200\) Monte Carlo replications with a sample size of \( T = 200\) observations). For each sample of \( \{(S_{t-1, i}, \tau_i)\}_{t=1,\ldots,T} \) where \( i = 1, \ldots, N \), we compute the residual functions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{R}_1(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) &= 1 - \left[ \beta d^{-1} h_R(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) \sum_{\tau'} \left\{ \frac{\Phi(\tau'|\tau_t)}{\mathcal{W}(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau')} \right\} \right] \mathcal{W}(S_{t-1}, \tau_t), \\
\mathcal{R}_2(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) &= 1 - \sum_{\tau'} \left\{ \left[ \frac{\hat{h}_\Pi(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau')}{\Pi} \right] \left( \frac{h\Pi(S_{t-1}, \tau_t)}{\Pi} \right)^{-1} \right\} \theta^{-1} \left[ \frac{\hat{h}_Y(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau')}{h\Pi(S_{t-1}, \tau_t)} \right] \\
& \times \left( \theta A^{-1} + d^{-1} \beta \xi \hat{Y}(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau') \right) \Phi(\tau'|\tau_t) \right\} / \mathcal{W}(S_{t-1}, \tau_t), \\
\mathcal{R}_3(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) &= 1 - \sum_{\tau'} \left\{ \left[ \frac{\hat{h}_\Pi(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau')}{\Pi} \right] \left( \frac{h\Pi(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t), \tau')}{\Pi} \right)^{-1} \right\} \theta^{-1} \left[ \frac{\hat{h}_Y(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau')}{h\Pi(S_{t-1}, \tau_t)} \right] \\
& \times \left( \theta - 1 \right) / \mathcal{W}(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau') + d^{-1} \beta \xi \hat{K}(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau') \right\} \Phi(\tau'|\tau_t) \right\} / \mathcal{K}(S_{t-1}, \tau_t).
\end{align*}
\]

Then, we calculate the mean and maximum of the residuals \( \{\mathcal{R}_j(S_{t-1, i}, \tau_i)\}_t \) across different samples \( i = 1, \ldots, N \) and residuals \( j = 1, \ldots, J \).

Table 3 (the columns with the label “Equilibrium paths”) shows the accuracy of each solution for the nonlinear model with the ZLB (Baseline), the nonlinear model without the ZLB (No ZLB in DGP), the quasi-linear model with the ZLB (Quasi-linear DGP), and the two models with different parameter values from the baseline (Case of low \( \bar{r}\tau \) and Case of large \( \sigma_d \)). The maximum size of residuals is about 0.3% in the baseline model \((10^{-2.527})\), and it is similar in the cases of low \( \bar{r}\tau \) and large \( \sigma_d \). This result suggests that our solution method is very accurate even in the presence of the ZLB, compared with previous studies such as Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015) and Maliar and Maliar (2015).\(^{18} \) The case of the quasi-linear model

\(^{17} \)In the quasi-linear model, the residual functions are

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{R}_1(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) &= h_Y(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) - \frac{\gamma - \bar{Y}_t}{1 + \gamma} + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma(1 + \gamma)} \left( h_R(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) - \bar{d}_t \right), \\
& - \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau'|\tau_t) \left\{ \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \hat{h}_Y(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau') + \frac{1 - \gamma}{\sigma(1 + \gamma)} \hat{h}_\Pi(h(S_{t-1}, \tau_t); \tau') \right\}, \\
\mathcal{R}_2(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) &= h\Pi(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) - \frac{\ell}{1 + \beta t} \bar{H}_t - \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta t} \sum_{\tau'} \Phi(\tau'|\tau_t) \hat{h}_\Pi(h(S_{t-1, \tau_t}); \tau') - \frac{(1 - \xi)(1 - \xi\beta)}{\xi(1 + \beta t)} \left[ \frac{\sigma}{1 - \gamma} h_Y(S_{t-1}, \tau_t) - \frac{\sigma\gamma}{1 - \gamma} \bar{Y}_t - \bar{A}_t \right].
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{18} \)Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), who use a Smolyak algorithm and
is even more accurate than the baseline case, although it is less accurate than that of the model without the ZLB; the maximum residuals are about 0.06% and <0.01% (10^{-3.195} and 10^{-4.570}), respectively.

We also evaluate the accuracy of the solutions based on 40,000 random points from uniform distributions over the entire state space. Table 3 (the columns with the label “Entire state space”) demonstrates the same tendency across the cases, although the errors are slightly larger (but acceptable).

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the same level of approximation, $\mu = 2$, report that the mean and maximum of the Euler equation error ($R_1(S_{t-1}, \tau_t)$ in this paper) are $10^{-3.256}$ and $10^{-1.648}$. Maliar and Maliar (2015) show that the mean and maximum errors across all equilibrium conditions (as in this paper) are $10^{-3.65}$ and $10^{-1.81}$ in the case with the ZLB and a third-degree polynomial solution with the EDS ($\varepsilon$-distinguishable set) grid.
References


Table 1: Prior and posterior distributions of parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Prior</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Baseline Mean</th>
<th>90% interval</th>
<th>No ZLB in DGP Mean</th>
<th>90% interval</th>
<th>Quasi-linear DGP Mean</th>
<th>90% interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>γ</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.510 [0.412, 0.609]</td>
<td>0.487 [0.385, 0.590]</td>
<td>0.500 [0.401, 0.600]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ξ</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.734 [0.693, 0.774]</td>
<td>0.743 [0.703, 0.783]</td>
<td>0.738 [0.697, 0.778]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ι</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.548 [0.363, 0.733]</td>
<td>0.498 [0.311, 0.683]</td>
<td>0.524 [0.340, 0.707]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φπ</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.731 [1.574, 1.887]</td>
<td>2.001 [1.815, 2.187]</td>
<td>1.838 [1.680, 1.995]</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φy</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.416 [0.307, 0.525]</td>
<td>0.495 [0.384, 0.605]</td>
<td>0.442 [0.334, 0.548]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φr</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.498 [0.453, 0.544]</td>
<td>0.495 [0.447, 0.543]</td>
<td>0.491 [0.447, 0.535]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>π̂</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.384 [0.333, 0.434]</td>
<td>0.498 [0.459, 0.537]</td>
<td>0.432 [0.383, 0.481]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>̄r</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.175 [0.130, 0.220]</td>
<td>0.248 [0.203, 0.293]</td>
<td>0.203 [0.156, 0.251]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρd</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.723 [0.645, 0.802]</td>
<td>0.698 [0.614, 0.782]</td>
<td>0.732 [0.655, 0.810]</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρa</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.683 [0.557, 0.809]</td>
<td>0.707 [0.586, 0.829]</td>
<td>0.693 [0.570, 0.817]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100σd</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>0.337 [0.247, 0.424]</td>
<td>0.296 [0.219, 0.371]</td>
<td>0.316 [0.235, 0.396]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100σa</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>0.334 [0.213, 0.451]</td>
<td>0.293 [0.187, 0.397]</td>
<td>0.323 [0.206, 0.435]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100σr</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>0.108 [0.099, 0.117]</td>
<td>0.100 [0.091, 0.108]</td>
<td>0.103 [0.094, 0.112]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Means and 90% intervals are the averages of the posterior means and 90% credible intervals based on 200 Monte Carlo replications using a sample size of 200 observations. In each of the Monte Carlo replications, 200,000 MCMC draws are generated and the first 25 percent of the draws are discarded. SD denotes standard deviation.
### Table 2: Posterior distributions of parameters in alternative experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>True value</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>90% interval</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>90% interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma )</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.530</td>
<td>[1.212, 1.844]</td>
<td>1.528</td>
<td>[1.209, 1.842]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>[0.424, 0.619]</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>[0.425, 0.619]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \xi )</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>[0.693, 0.773]</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>[0.694, 0.773]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \nu )</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>[0.388, 0.754]</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>[0.390, 0.755]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_\pi )</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>1.614</td>
<td>[1.456, 1.771]</td>
<td>1.619</td>
<td>[1.459, 1.778]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_y )</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>[0.263, 0.487]</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>[0.265, 0.486]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_r )</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>[0.466, 0.562]</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>[0.468, 0.561]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\pi} )</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>[0.294, 0.400]</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>[0.299, 0.405]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{r} \bar{r} )</td>
<td>0.22/0.25</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>[0.094, 0.182]</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>[0.130, 0.219]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_d )</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>[0.644, 0.800]</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>[0.638, 0.794]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_a )</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td>[0.544, 0.800]</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>[0.543, 0.799]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100( \sigma_d )</td>
<td>0.30/0.33</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>[0.251, 0.440]</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>[0.277, 0.484]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100( \sigma_a )</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>[0.225, 0.481]</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>[0.226, 0.481]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100( \sigma_r )</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>[0.105, 0.124]</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>[0.108, 0.128]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In the case of low \( \bar{r} \bar{r} \), the true value of \( \bar{r} \bar{r} \) is 0.22. In the case of large \( \sigma_d \), the true value of 100\( \sigma_d \) is 0.33. Means and 90% intervals are the averages of the posterior means and 90% credible intervals based on 200 Monte Carlo replications using a sample size of 200 observations. In each of the Monte Carlo replications, 200,000 MCMC draws are generated and the first 25 percent of the draws are discarded.

### Table 3: Accuracy of the solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibrium paths</th>
<th>Entire state space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \log_{10} L_1 )</td>
<td>( \log_{10} L_\infty )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>-3.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ZLB in DGP</td>
<td>-5.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case of low ( \bar{r} \bar{r} )</td>
<td>-3.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case of large ( \sigma_d )</td>
<td>-3.453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( L_1 \) and \( L_\infty \) are the average and maximum of the absolute residuals across all the equilibrium conditions based on 40,000 points of \( (S_{-1}, \tau) \) on the equilibrium paths and 40,000 random points from uniform distributions over the entire state space, respectively.
Figure 1: Policy functions

Notes: The figure shows the policy functions of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate for the range of the state variables shown on each horizontal axis. The thick solid, thin solid, and dashed lines represent the policy functions of the nonlinear model with the ZLB, the nonlinear model without the ZLB, and the quasi-linear model with the ZLB, respectively.
Figure 2: Impulse responses in the baseline experiment

(1) Discount factor shock

(2) Productivity shock

(3) Monetary policy shock

Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation shocks to the discount factor, productivity, and monetary policy. The thick solid lines represent the true responses, the dots are the responses of the linearized model with true parameters, and the thin solid and dashed lines are the averages of the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the estimated responses, respectively, where the averages are taken over 200 Monte Carlo replications.
Figure 3: Impulse responses in the case of low $r^r$

(1) Discount factor shock

(2) Productivity shock

(3) Monetary policy shock

Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation shocks to the discount factor, productivity, and monetary policy. The thick solid lines represent the true responses, the dots are the responses of the linearized model with true parameters, and the thin solid and dashed lines are the averages of the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the estimated responses, respectively, where the averages are taken over 200 Monte Carlo replications.
Figure 4: Impulse responses in the case of large $\sigma_d$

(1) Discount factor shock

(2) Productivity shock

(3) Monetary policy shock

Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate (in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady state) to one standard deviation shocks to the discount factor, productivity, and monetary policy. The thick solid lines represent the true responses, the dots are the responses of the linearized model with true parameters, and the thin solid and dashed lines are respectively the averages of the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the estimated responses, where the averages are taken over 200 Monte Carlo replications.