

Cleaning the Air with the Invisible Hand

*Theodore Crone and Robert H. DeFina**

Through the centuries, lawmakers have resorted to a variety of measures to combat air pollution. During the middle ages, for example, King Edward I of England established a reputation as an uncompromising environmentalist by executing a man for burning coal instead of oak. Although they may share Edward's sense of urgency, most modern-day advocates of a cleaner environment favor less harsh measures. Indeed, economists have long argued that Adam Smith's invisible hand can be more effective than the regulatory axe in controlling pollution.

In the United States, efforts to maintain an

acceptable level of air quality involve the direct regulation of individual sources of pollution, such as coal-burning generators. Under this system, each polluter must abide by rules, developed at various levels of government, that specify both the required amount of pollution abatement and the technology to be used at each source of pollution.

Although this source-by-source approach has resulted in some improvement in air quality, it has come under fire from both business and environmental groups. Business claims that the complex of regulations is cumbersome and cost-ineffective and that it inhibits industrial development. Environmentalists express dismay at what they consider an unacceptably slow pace of progress in meeting stated air quality goals.

In response to these concerns the federal government has begun complementing direct regulation with a number of financial incentives

*Theodore Crone and Robert H. DeFina are in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Dr. Crone is an economist in the Regional and Urban Section, and Dr. DeFina is a senior economist in the Macroeconomics Section.

for pollution control. The introduction of these so-called controlled trading options has been applauded by economists, who have long maintained that financial incentives are the most effective policy tool in the fight for cleaner air. In fact, many economists have recommended a full-blown market in pollution rights, placing maximum reliance on incentives and minimum reliance on direct controls. Such a market holds the promise of achieving the desired air quality at a lower cost.

STRIVING FOR CLEAN AIR

Legislators face two tasks in regulating air pollution. First, they must decide what level of air quality is to be maintained and when that level should be achieved. Second, they must determine how to reach the desired level within the specified time limit.

Since clean air is a common good shared by all, the decision on the level of air quality is ultimately a political one.¹ Currently, the national air quality goals are set forth in the 1963 Clean Air Act and its amendments [see MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON AIR POLLUTION]. In that legislation, Congress mandated that pollution levels be set low enough to eliminate all adverse effects on health and public welfare, and entrusted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the responsibility for setting specific air quality standards for major pollutants.² These standards are nationwide maximum allowable limits on pollutant concen-

trations in the atmosphere.

In 1977 Congress also established a timetable for compliance, requiring each state to submit to the EPA a State Implementation Plan (SIP) by July 1, 1979. These plans were to guarantee that regions which did not already meet the national standards for major pollutants (*nonattainment* areas) would achieve these standards by December 31, 1982.³ The SIPs were also to contain regulations to "prevent significant deterioration" of air quality in regions which already met the national standards (*attainment* areas). Neither deadline in this timetable was met. By the end of 1981 only twelve SIPs had been approved by the EPA. And by February 1983, over 470 counties (out of 3,041) still did not meet the national standard for at least one major pollutant.

A key factor in these delays was *how* regulators chose to achieve the national air quality standards. Initially, the government relied exclusively on direct regulation of individual pollution sources. (A source is defined as any installation which emits one or more pollutants. Under this definition, a single industrial plant can have several separate sources.) When formulating pollution control guidelines for firms in attainment and nonattainment areas, regulators identify what is considered the best available control technology for each emissions source, given the source's special characteristics.⁴ Polluters then must adopt that technology and reach the lowest achievable emissions rate possible. If a firm wants to use an alternative technology to reduce emissions, it normally has to present evidence that the alternative technology will be at least as effective as the

¹The political approach does not make economic considerations irrelevant. From the point of view of the total welfare of the community, pollution should be reduced to the level where the cost of preventing a bit more pollution is equal to the benefit of the resulting cleaner air. Air quality is a public good, however, so there are incentives to misrepresent the benefit one receives from cleaner air. And in practice it is not possible to measure accurately the costs and benefits of improving air quality. Nevertheless, these economic considerations should inform the political decision. For a theoretical discussion of the optimal level of pollution, see W. J. Baumol and W. E. Oates, *The Theory of Environmental Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), chapter 4.

²See Paul R. Portney, et al., eds., *Current Issues in U.S. Environmental Policy*, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press/Resources for the Future, 1978), pp. 30-36 for a discussion and critique of the standard-setting procedure. For a detailed study of the health effects of air pollution, see Lester B. Lave and Eugene P. Seskin, *Air Pollution and Human Health* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

³For carbon monoxide and ozone, extensions to December 31, 1987, could be authorized if a state demonstrated that attainment of the standards before December 31, 1982, was impossible.

⁴We use the term regulators to include both the EPA and the individual state agencies because they share responsibility for achieving the mandated air quality levels. The major mechanism for enforcement is the State Implementation Plan, but this plan is subject to review and approval by the EPA. The federal agency also has general oversight authority to ensure that the provisions of the SIP are fulfilled. For further details on the overlapping responsibility of the federal and state governments, see *13th Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 72-78.

method mandated by the government.

This process has proved quite time-consuming. It requires numerous studies both by regulators and by those who are regulated. Moreover, formal hearings are often necessary to gather information and to resolve disputes.⁵ The inordinate amount

⁵The delays inherent in the process are illustrated by the 1981 report of the National Commission on Air Quality which analyzed the preconstruction review procedures for new sources seeking to locate in pristine areas. The Commission found that the time involved between submission of a con-

struction application and receipt of a permit averaged about 16 months. If we add to this the requirement to furnish one year's air quality monitoring data with the application, an applicant's typical delay for the entire permitting process can be as long as two or three years. This example is cited in Kenneth W. Chilton and Ronald J. Penoyer, *Making the Clean Air Act More Cost-Effective*. (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1981), pp. 15-16.

struction application and receipt of a permit averaged about 16 months. If we add to this the requirement to furnish one year's air quality monitoring data with the application, an applicant's typical delay for the entire permitting process can be as long as two or three years. This example is cited in Kenneth W. Chilton and Ronald J. Penoyer, *Making the Clean Air Act More Cost-Effective*. (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, 1981), pp. 15-16.

MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON AIR POLLUTION^a

Date of Enactment	Popular Title	Key Provisions
July 14, 1955	1955 Air Pollution Control Act	Authorized federal program of research on air pollution control.
December 17, 1963	Clean Air Act	Gave the federal government the right to hold hearings, call conferences, and take court action in the case of interstate air pollution and to assist states with intrastate pollution problems.
October 20, 1965	Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act	Gave the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) authority to set emissions standards for automobiles.
November 21, 1967	Air Quality Act of 1967	Authorized HEW to oversee the setting of state standards for ambient air quality and the development of state implementation plans; set national standards for automobile emissions.
December 31, 1970	Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970	Expanded the role of the federal government in setting and enforcing ambient air quality standards; established stricter emissions standards for automobiles.
August 4, 1977	Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977	Authorized an emissions offset policy to allow new sources to enter an area as long as pollution is offset by reduction at other sources; set even more stringent standards for automobile emissions.

^aA more comprehensive description of this legislation is found in Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, *Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), Winston Harrington and Alan J. Krupnick, "Stationary Source Pollution Policy and Choices for Reform," *Natural Resources Journal*, (July, 1981), pp. 539-564, and Paul R. Portney, et al., eds., *Current Issues in U.S. Environmental Policy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press/Resources for the Future, 1978) Chapter 2.

cost; that is, if it were efficient. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. While some improvements in air quality have been achieved, the gains have been expensive [see PROGRESS AND COSTS...].

Several factors contribute to the inefficiency of the traditional approach to pollution control. Direct source-by-source regulation ignores differences in abatement costs among sources when allocating responsibility for pollution abatement. It also limits the development and introduction of cost-saving abatement technology, and unnecessarily restricts industrial development.

Direct Regulation Ignores Cost Differences . . . Due to diverse production technologies and changing economic conditions, some firms can reduce emissions of a particular pollutant at some sources more cheaply than at others. But because it is applied uniformly, direct source-by-source regulation fails to take advantage of this difference in the cost of reducing emissions. Consider, for example, a plant which emits sulphur dioxide (SO₂) from two different sources. Due to differences in production processes, the cost of reducing SO₂ emissions at Source A is \$2,000 a ton, and the cost of reducing emissions at Source B is \$4,000 a ton. If source-by-source regulation requires the reduction of SO₂ by two tons, emissions at *each* source would have to be reduced by one ton, at a total cost of \$6,000. It is easy to see, however, that the cheapest way to reduce SO₂ by two tons is to concentrate all of the reduction at Source A at a total cost of \$4,000. In general, uniform reduction of emissions at all sources does not minimize the costs of pollution control.

Although in theory regulators could devise a cost-minimizing plan for pollution control, in practice, information requirements preclude the possibility. Government regulators cannot know the costs, the technological opportunities, and the alternative raw materials available for every plant in every industry. And even if they could determine the most efficient allocation of responsibility for pollution abatement for each source, they would have to revise their regulations continually in light of changing economic conditions. Consequently, regulators simply require the same degree of abatement from each source, namely, the lowest achievable emissions rate consistent with the chosen technology. But because the cost of reducing emissions a bit more (the marginal

cost of abatement) varies from source to source, direct regulation has not been cost-efficient.

. . . Limits Innovation in Abatement Technology . . .

Regulations have focused on the use of pollution control devices such as scrubbers or filters because they are easy to evaluate and can be applied at several kinds of sources. As a result, innovations in pollution control technology are biased toward these devices, and opportunities to reduce emissions by modifying or redesigning parts of an existing manufacturing facility may be lost. It is often possible to design fundamental cost-saving innovations in existing manufacturing techniques that will reduce emissions. Outside engineers employed by regulators, however, are unlikely to be able to recommend fundamental changes in manufacturing processes, because knowledge of these processes is often proprietary. While the regulated firms themselves are in a position to discover more efficient abatement procedures, they are discouraged from introducing them by the bureaucratic complexities they face when trying to supplant the mandated technique.


. . . And Unnecessarily Restricts Industrial Development. Inefficiencies also arise because the regulations aimed at maintaining a region's air quality limit industrial development in that area. The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act do not allow major new emissions sources to be built in nonattainment areas, for example. The law also stunts development in attainment areas, since the requirement to prevent significant deterioration in air quality limits the entry of new polluters. These regulations can prevent a prospective new business from ever operating, or they can force it to operate at a less profitable location, no matter how much the new business would be willing to pay for a portion of the emissions quota currently used by existing sources. Such restrictions raise the cost of pollution abatement needlessly.

TOWARD A MARKET APPROACH

The shortcomings of source-by-source regulation spell a case for reform, and in the late 1970s the EPA began to examine alternative methods for controlling airborne emissions. Of particular interest were market-like schemes for pollution abatement. Instead of directly controlling the behavior of each emissions source, the market

**PROGRESS AND COSTS
IN CLEANING THE AIR**

**TRENDS IN URBAN AIR QUALITY
1974-1980**



The graph shows the average number of days that the EPA's Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reached 100 ("unhealthy") for 19 metropolitan areas: Chicago, Cincinnati, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Louisville, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Portland (OR), San Bernardino, Rochester, Sacramento, St. Louis, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Seattle, Syracuse, Tampa, and Washington, D.C.

The reduction in pollution between 1974 and 1980 is probably not wholly attributable to official abatement measures and may be due in part to changes in industrial activity or automobile use.

Source: 12th Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality (Washington: GPO, 1981), Table A-51.

**NATIONAL EXPENDITURES
FOR AIR POLLUTION
ABATEMENT AND CONTROL^a**

Year	Current Dollars (billions)	1972 Dollars (billions)
1972	\$6.5	\$6.5
1973	8.3	7.8
1974	10.4	8.1
1975	12.8	9.1
1976	14.2	9.5
1977	15.6	9.8
1978	17.1	10.1
1979	20.5	10.4
1980	25.4	11.2

^aSource: 13th Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality (Washington: GPO, 1982), Table A-80.

approach introduces financial incentives for firms to reallocate responsibility for abatement among themselves in order to achieve air quality goals at least cost. Unlike the traditional approach which places all decisionmaking in the hands of government regulators, a financial incentives policy enlists the expertise of the regulated firms in the fight for cleaner air. Allowing the firms to decide *how* to achieve mandated air quality levels can overcome many of the drawbacks of source-by-source regulation.

Thus far, the EPA has proceeded cautiously. Rather than wholly abandoning direct regulation, it has approved only limited use of financial incentives. To date, three incentive schemes, or controlled-trading options as they are known, have been developed. These are *bubbles*, *offsets*, and *banks*, and each is aimed at eliminating some shortcoming of the source-by-source approach.⁶

Bubbles. The bubble concept is designed to take account of the different incremental costs of controlling pollution, both across processes within a particular plant and across plants and firms. A figurative "bubble" is placed around an entire plant or area, treating it as a single source of emissions rather than as a series of independent sources. The bubble program allows regulators to set emissions limits for a plant as a whole, while managers are free to allocate pollution abatement among the various sources so long as the overall emissions target is attained. Consequently, the bubble provides an important incentive for keeping down the cost of abatement. Because the decisions by the managers on how to meet emissions limits will directly affect the profits of their firms, managers are encouraged to reduce overall outlays by increasing pollution control at sources where incremental abatement costs are low and decreasing control where costs are high. Under certain conditions, the bubble program can be expanded to include more than one plant or firm. The bubble

⁶A more extensive explanation of these procedures and their legislative histories is found in Sue Anne Batey Blackman and William J. Baumol, "Modified Fiscal Incentives in Environmental Policy," *Land Economics* 56 (November, 1980) pp. 417-431, Bruce Yandle, "The Emerging Market in Air Pollution Rights," *Regulation*, 2 (July/August, 1978), pp. 21-29, and Michael T. Maloney and Bruce Yandle, "Bubbles and Efficiency," *Regulation* 4 (May/June 1980), pp. 49-52.

concept is limited to existing firms, however, and excludes potential emissions sources.

Experience with bubbles suggests the type of cost-savings the approach can achieve.⁷ In Tampa, Florida, for instance, an electric utility used the bubble to reduce the costs of controlling SO₂. The utility reported savings of \$20 million. By including two side-by-side power plants within a bubble, the New England Electric System in Providence, Rhode Island has been able to use different fuels at each plant and to save \$4 million in fuel costs in two and a half years. In Middletown, Ohio, Armco substituted dust-reducing actions on its plant site for pollution controls in its steelmaking process. The company was able to save \$20 million in capital costs and \$2.5 million a year in operating costs. Regulators are currently involved in over 200 prospective bubbles, and it is estimated that these projects alone could save \$600 million in capital and first-year operating costs.

Offsets. The offset program was developed primarily as a way to allow new plants to open and old ones to expand in nonattainment areas, while ensuring that air quality did not deteriorate. The offset differs from the bubble in two ways. Bubbles apply to existing sources only; offsets make room for new sources. And while bubbles do not necessarily reduce the amount of air pollution, offsets do. Prior to the introduction of offsets, construction of new emissions sources and expansions of existing ones were prohibited in nonattainment areas. The offset program allows such construction and expansions if the new emissions that result are *more than offset* by reductions in emissions from existing sources. These reductions can be effected either within the expanding firm or at another firm in the area. The new pollution source must use the best available control technology and attain the lowest achievable emissions rate. Moreover, an existing firm cannot participate in an offset program until it has achieved the level of abatement already required by regulators.

The offset policy allows firms that wish to intro-

duce new sources of pollution to strike bargains with existing firms by offering to buy emissions reductions for them. For example, a potential entrant might agree to purchase extra pollution-control equipment and services for an established plant. Besides allowing for growth in nonattainment areas, offsets exert downward pressure on the cost of any additional abatement that is required. Prospective polluters will always try to deal with firms that have the lowest pollution control costs, since this will minimize their cost of entering the nonattainment area.

Since the program began in early 1977, the EPA reports that hundreds of offsets have taken place. Most arrangements have been internal, with companies finding offsets to expand their own facilities. An example is Phillips Petroleum Co., which added new pollution sources in order to double the capacity of its refinery in Brazoria County, Texas. The emissions from these new sources were offset by providing better control of hydrocarbon emissions from existing storage tanks and other facilities. Likewise, the Corpus Christi Petrochemical Co., a partnership formed by three companies, offset emissions from a new \$600 million ethylene plant by closing down a vacuum distillation unit owned by one of the partners.⁸ Offsets involving different companies are not yet common.

Banks. The emissions bank program is really an extension of the offset program, affording greater flexibility in terms of timing the trade of emissions reductions. If a firm reduces its daily emissions below mandated levels, it can "bank" those reductions, that is, hold them in reserve at a clearinghouse, for trade at some future date. In this way, the basic offset program is made more efficient, since potential polluters don't have to expend substantial amounts of resources trying to locate offset partners; instead, they can simply consult the clearinghouse inventory. By lowering the costs involved with offsets, the bank program increases the incentive for firms to engage in offset transactions. Normally, only some fraction of the reduction in emissions is eligible for sale and is determined by the regulators on a case by case basis. For example, if a source reduces its SO₂

⁷This and the following examples are cited in Timothy B. Clark, "New Approaches to Regulatory Reform—Letting the Market Do the Job," *National Journal* 32 (August 11, 1979); and Steven J. Marcus, "Bubble Policy: Pros and Cons," *The New York Times*, (June 30, 1983), p. D2.

⁸These two examples as well as others are found in Timothy B. Clark, "New Approaches...", p. 1319.

emissions by 1,000 lbs. per day more than the standard requires, it may only be able to sell 750 lbs. per day in the banking program. Thus, each transaction under the bank program results in a net reduction in emissions.

Experience with emissions banks is very limited. Banking programs have recently begun in San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Louisville, but few transactions have actually taken place. Interest is growing, however, and at last count, about thirty states were formally considering the banking approach.⁹

HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?

It is understandable that regulators' first steps away from exclusive reliance on source-by-source regulation have been hesitant. Despite the intellectual appeal of a market-based environmental policy, it would not have been in anyone's interest to rush headlong into schemes whose practical difficulties and consequences had not been explored. But exactly how far have we come from the traditional approach?

The controlled-trading options are only supplements to a continued primary dependence on source-by-source regulation.¹⁰ Indeed, the trading options retain some of the inflexibilities of direct regulation and consequently blunt the potential for substantial cost-saving. For example, all trading procedures are subject to full review on a case by case basis, involving federal, state, and local regulators. The consequences of operating in this bureaucratic maze are highlighted by the attempt of Standard Oil of Ohio to use the offset program.¹¹ Standard Oil proposed to build a major pipeline terminal in a nonattainment area in California. To offset the pollution from the terminal, Standard Oil offered to pay \$90 million to control emissions at a nearby power plant, three dry cleaning plants, and a glass manufacturing facility. The company cancelled its plans in early 1979, however, blaming

delays in obtaining government licenses and permits.

A second shortcoming is that the substitutions or trades allowed under the different options are very restrictive. Under the bubble policy, for instance, trades exclude potential entrants. And under the offset and bank programs, neither trading partner can end up emitting more than the standard allows for any existing source. As a result, un-economic differences in pollution abatement costs created by existing regulations are allowed to persist. In addition, the standards specifying allowable control technologies remain in place, further reducing the flexibility of the incentive plans.

The trading options also suffer from the absence of a formal method of organizing prospective trades. As yet, rules and procedures that guide transactions are not well established, and convenient institutional arrangements for facilitating trades, such as clearinghouses, are for the most part absent. Because of these limitations the costs of locating partners and negotiating prices are high, and this works to discourage or prevent trades from taking place.

A final problem with the trading options is the uncertainty surrounding the long-term status of traded permits. Under current practice, should regulators want to tighten an area's standards, traded permits would be rescinded first. This decreases the desirability of traded permits relative to nontraded ones and makes potential trading partners less willing to use the options.

HOW FAR CAN WE GO?

Results from the controlled trading options, while limited, are encouraging. And, as the following quote from the *12th Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality* suggests, policymakers are becoming more receptive to the use of financial incentives in environmental programs:

Whenever possible, the achievement of environmental goals and the protection of environmental standards should be left to free market mechanisms. (p.17)

Regulatory agencies could expand the use of free market mechanisms in a number of ways. One is to

⁹Cited in Winston Harrington and Alan J. Krupnick, "Stationary Source Pollution Policy and Choices for Reform," *Natural Resources Journal* 21 (1981), pp. 556-557.

¹⁰The line of discussion that follows parallels one in Robert W. Hahn, "Marketable Permits: What's All the Fuss About?" *Journal of Public Policy*, 2 (October 1982), pp. 395-411.

¹¹Cited in Timothy B. Clark, "New Approaches..." p. 1318.

continue the piecemeal approach begun with the controlled-trading options, gradually introducing financial incentives into more and more parts of the regulatory scheme. This conservative strategy does have the virtue of treading lightly in uncharted areas; however, it also has a vice. In the words of Roger Noll, support for the use of economic incentives ultimately

“... may sink because the new trading methods are so procedurally freighted, so limited in applicability, and so burdened with uncertainties... Too timid a reform leads to few transactions and market imperfections that undermine the efficiency of the trades that take place. Even in the absence of a policy catastrophe, the system could prove so cumbersome that it is uninteresting to polluting entities....”¹²

And, unfortunately, the chance for much more efficient pollution control would sink with it.

The possibility for a more sweeping change in approach exists in the creation of a full-blown market in rights to emit pollution.¹³ Under this scheme, regulators first establish within each air quality region a ceiling on total emissions that is consistent with air quality standards. They then issue permits to area sources that allow a specified amount of a pollutant to be emitted per unit of

time, where the aggregate quantity of permits accommodates no more than the ceiling level of emissions. Once the permits are initially allocated, a source is free both to choose its desired abatement procedure and to buy or sell permits from other firms in an effort to minimize its pollution control costs. A firm's only restriction is that it may not emit more pollution than is allowed by the permits it holds.¹⁴ Permit prices would be determined by the market, that is, by supply and demand.

Essentially, this market approach incorporates all the benefits of the controlled-trading options while eliminating their restrictive aspects. The market enhances the range of choices and provides flexibility to adapt, for instance. Firms may try to reduce pollution control costs by engaging in voluntary, mutually beneficial agreements that rearrange abatement responsibilities. But the market approach imposes no limitations on the types of trades that can be made. Furthermore, firms are given maximum latitude in picking abatement procedures. As a result, the market automatically guides firms toward achieving a given level of pollution control at the *minimum* possible cost. Use of direct regulation or the controlled-trading options cannot produce the same degree of efficiency.

The market system also automatically allows for economic growth while maintaining the air quality standard. When the desire to hold permits increases because of plans to expand an existing operation or to add to the number of plants in an area, the price of a permit will rise. As this price increases, some firms will find it more economical

¹²Roger G. Noll, “The Feasibility of Marketable Emissions Permits in the United States,” California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 397, (July, 1981), p. 58.

¹³The idea of a market in pollution rights was formally introduced in J. H. Dales, *Pollution, Property, and Prices* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). More recent studies provide thorough analyses of the practical issues involved in implementing such a market. With regard to air pollution, see Robert W. Hahn and Roger G. Noll, “Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits,” California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 398, (July, 1981), and Thomas H. Tietenberg, “Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis,” *Land Economics*, 56 (November 1980), pp. 391-416. For a detailed discussion of the application of a market in emissions rights to the problem of water pollution, see M. David, et al., “Marketable Permits for the Control of Phosphorus Effluent Into Lake Michigan,” *Water Resources Research*, 16 (April, 1980), pp. 263-270, as well as the companion articles in the October, 1980, and December, 1980, issues of that journal.

¹⁴A related approach is the imposition of an effluent fee or tax on each unit of pollution emitted. Under this scheme, an emitter is given an incentive to reduce emissions whenever such a reduction would be cheaper than paying the tax. Hence, the tax serves the same purpose as the price of a pollution permit. A great advantage of the permits approach, however, is that once the allowable level of emissions is set, the market mechanism automatically determines the appropriate price. With a tax, regulators must use trial and error to find the right rate. Also, the tax rate would have to be legislatively adjusted on an ongoing basis to reflect changing economic conditions. For a discussion of the problems involved with using pollution taxes, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Effluent Charges: A Critique,” *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 6 (November, 1973), pp. 512-528.

to increase abatement and sell some permits to potential entrants to the area. In this way, production can increase without increasing emissions.

Finally, a market approach would provide incentives to develop new, more efficient abatement technology, since a firm would be rewarded financially through sales of permits to firms that are less efficient in pollution control. This is beneficial from a long-term perspective, since it allows air quality standards to be met at lower total costs.

Under a permit system, regulators would play a somewhat different role from their current one. They would continue to determine the overall air quality level and to monitor compliance by each firm, responsibilities that are present under any approach.¹⁵ However, they would no longer allocate the abatement efforts among sources or require specific pollution control technologies. The allocation would be left to the market and the

choice of technology would be left to the firms themselves. Regulators would now be concerned with the operational aspects of the market, such as issuing permits, determining the maturity and initial distribution of permits, and delimiting market areas.

The tentative movements in the direction of a full-blown market (bubbles, offsets, and banks) suggest that further moves toward a pollution permit system could satisfy the objections of both industry and environmentalists to the current system. On the one hand, the cost of pollution control would be reduced; on the other, there would be less opportunity to delay compliance by exploiting bureaucratic procedures. These advantages would make the permit system not only economically efficient but also politically attractive.

¹⁵A system of pollution permits would not eliminate the problem of non-compliance. However, monitoring would be easier since regulators would simply have to measure the

emissions rate at each source and would not have to determine whether specific equipment was being used and properly maintained.

BUSINESS REVIEW INDEX 1983

JANUARY/FEBRUARY

Richard W. Lang, "Using Econometric Models to Make Economic Policy: A Continuing Controversy"
Jan G. Loeys, "Deregulation: A New Future for Thrifts"

MARCH/APRIL

Theodore Crone, "The Condominium Trend: Response to Inflation"
Mark J. Flannery, "Removing Deposit Rate Ceilings: How Will Bank Profits Fare?"

MAY/JUNE

Herb Taylor, "The Discount Window and Money Control"
Brian C. Gendreau, "When is the Prime Rate Second Choice?"

JULY/AUGUST

Stephen A. Meyer, "Tax Cuts: Reality or Illusion?"
Janice M. Moulton, "Delaware Moves Toward Interstate Banking: A Look at the FCDA"

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER (REGIONAL ISSUE)

Gerald Carlina, "New Employment Growth Trends: The U.S. and the Third District"
Robert P. Inman, "Anatomy of a Fiscal Crisis"
Eleanor Graig and Scott Reznick, "Economic Development in the Third District States: Three Approaches"
Edwin S. Mills, "Epilogue"

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER

Nicholas Carlozzi, "Exchange Rate Volatility: Is Intervention the Answer?"
Theodore Crone and Robert H. DeFina, "Cleaning the Air With the Invisible Hand"



Business Review
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Address Correction Requested